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 Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the causes and origins of the Braamfontein Explosion or disaster of 
1896, while outlining its immediate effects. Various sources do discuss or mention a cause 
for the explosion, yet on a closer inspection of the evidence, it becomes apparent that the 
causes were not as simplistic as suggested in these works. The investigation discusses the 
critical chain of events that led up to the explosion, while proposing what can be considered 
the possible cause or causes. To do so, this thesis will be looking at the various industrial and 
social components that surround the perception of the explosion such as the dynamite 
industry, the railway company and the official investigation that followed. Additionally the 
thesis will be a lens upon the unique characteristics of the Witwatersrand of that time, by 
presenting the nuances of its various people that were involved with and or affected by the 
explosion. The year 1896 was not a particularly pleasant year for the Rand – it was on alert 
following the Jameson Raid, it was enduring a drought that led to water scarcity, as well as 
the average feature of town fire or the odd homicide. Thus the explosion came at a difficult 
time, and affected the most vulnerable of the town. It is the hope that this thesis will recount 
the events before, during and after the explosion, to create a fuller and more accurate image, 
but by no means can it encompass all facets of the event.  
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die oorsake en oorsprong van die ontploffing of ramp in 
Braamfontein van 1896, sowel as die onmiddellike gevolge daarvan. Daar is sekondêre 
bronne wat wel ‟n oorsaak vir die ontploffing bespreek, maar by nadere betragting het dit 
geblyk ‟n oorvereenvoudige vertolking te wees. Hierdie ondersoek bespreek die kritiese 
ketting van gebeure wat aanleiding tot die ontploffing gegee het, terwyl dit alternatiewe redes 
vir die ontploffing oorweeg. Dienooreenkomstig let die tesis op die verskillende industriële 
en sosiale komponente wat die persepsie van die ontploffing omgeef het, soos byvoorbeeld 
die die dinamietbedryf, die Spoorwegmaatskappy en die amptelike ondersoek wat gevolg het. 
Verder poog die tesis om 'n lens wees op die unieke eienskappe van die Witwatersrand van 
daardie tyd, deur onder meer  genuanseerde ontledings van die verskillende mense en hulle 
belewenisse wat betrokke was of direk deur die ontploffing geraak is. Die jaar 1896 was nie 
‟n baie aangename jaar op die Rand nie – daar was paniek na die Jameson Inval, daar was 'n 
droogte saam met waterskaarste, sowel as die gebruiklike brand en moord. Die ontploffing 
het op ‟n moeilike tyd gekom en die dorp se mees kwesbare mense geraak. Daar word 
gehoop dat hierdie tesis die gebeure voor, tydens en na die ontploffing duidelik te berde sal 
bring om ‟n volledige en meer akkurate beeld te skep. Dit gee egter nie voor om alle fasette 
van die ontfloffing te dek nie. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
The Braamfontein Explosion took place in the heart of the poorer districts of early 
Johannesburg – itself at the time, a cauldron of social, industrial and political broiling.1 What 
makes the explosion fascinating is not only its unique collective setting, but the fact that the 
direct cause of it remains a mystery. It is the intention of this thesis, to delve into the chain of 
events that took place prior to the explosion, as well as the experience of the explosion itself 
and the immediate repercussions. This is in the hope of revealing and understanding more 
about the cause or causes, while framing the event within the overhanging currents of the 
early Witwatersrand.  
 
Literature Review 
Disaster is a broad term – in the English speaking world, the word disaster refers to all large 
scale destructive catastrophes, such as “natural disasters” including earthquakes, flooding, 
storms, fires and epidemics as well as “human made disasters” or “technical threats” such as 
power plant accidents, wars, acts of terror and in the case of this thesis accidental explosions.
2
 
The history of disasters as a genre is still a developing field, even though it has been 
cultivated in different disciplines for decades, it has been recognised as neglected in the field 
of history. Arno Borst, in his prominent 1981 work regarding the Carinthian earthquake of 
1348, acknowledged that historical disaster research was largely neglected and asserted that 
disasters (namely natural disasters) were an essential part of the social experience and 
therefore belonged within the field of history.
3
  With that being said, disasters still attract the 
attention and interests of researchers, compelling their desire for historical events. Disasters 
are also attractive from the conceptual standpoints of economics and politics, as their 
examination is connected with attempts to improve and prepare infrastructural conditions for 
their eventual return. Gerrit Schenk tells us that there has been no “comprehensive history of 
the engagement with disasters from an explicitly historical angle”.4 He further advocates that 
                                                 
1
 C. van Onselen: New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, p. 2; A. P. 
Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, p. 71.  
2
 G. J. Schenk: “Historical disaster research. State of Research, Concepts, Methods and Case 
Studies,” Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, (32), (3), 2007, p. 12. 
3
 A. Borst: “Das Erdbeben von 1348,” Historische Zeitschrift, (233), (JG), 1981, p. 532. 
4
 G. J. Schenk: “Historical disaster research. State of Research, Concepts, Methods and Case 
Studies,” Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, (32), (3), 2007, p. 11. 
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due to the extensive differences between disasters, historians should identify what makes 
them a “uniformed researched object,” for the purposes of a specific analysis.5 What can be 
referred to as true “historical disaster research” only began appearing, in a more tangible 
sense, in the 1990s, with many of its scholars coming from the University of Grenoble. These 
French scholars encouraged an all-inclusive cultural studies analysis of disasters and their 
reasoning is seen through the words of two of them:
6
 “A history of 'total' disaster, taking into 
account their components (geographic, social, economic, cultural), is possible and 
necessary.”7 German historian Arno Borst was another pioneer of this idea of a 
comprehensive disaster history and his structure of analysis was focussed on perception or 
experience, interpretation, description, reactions, coping, and remembrance.
8
  
 
Disasters have been classified based on their consequences – for example “those which 
involve loss of life especially to breadwinners,” and “those which involve destruction of 
property, and frequently life as well.”9 Other academics have distinguished disasters based on 
their characteristics and their consequences, through the idea of looking at the “character of 
the precipitating event, or catastrophe, and the scope of the resulting cultural collapse.”10 And 
based on this idea they have identified four types of disasters: a) an “instantaneous-diffused 
type,” which occurs and ends before anyone can do something about it, and affects the whole 
community; b) an “instantaneous-focalised type,” which affects a concentrated area within a 
town or community and thus leaves the rest of the infrastructure physically undamaged; c) a 
“progressive-diffused type,” this type of disaster can last for several hours or days, and affect 
the entire community; and d) a “progressive-focalised type,” which is a concentrated disaster 
that unfolds in several hours such as the sinking of the Titanic.
11
  The Halifax Explosion of 
1917 was used as an example to explain the “instantaneous-diffused” disaster type mentioned 
above.
12
 This explosion took place on the morning of December 6, 1917, in the Canadian city 
of Halifax, Nova Scotia, towards the tail end of the First World War. The explosion was the 
                                                 
5
 G. J. Schenk: “Historical disaster research. State of research, concepts, methods and case studies,” Historical 
Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, (32), (3), 2007, p. 11. 
6
 Ibid., p. 15. French scholars Jacques Berlioz and Gregory Quenet. 
7
 In the original French: “Une histoire 'totale' des catastrophe, prenant en compte leurs composants 
(geographique, sociale, economique, culturelle), est possible et necessaire.” 
8
 G. J. Schenk: “Historical disaster research. State of research, concepts, methods and case studies,” Historical 
Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung, (32), (3), 2007, p. 16. 
9
 S. A. Queen & D. M. Mann: Social pathology, p. 431. 
10
 L. J. Carr: “Disaster and the sequence-pattern concept of social change,” American Journal of Sociology, (38), 
(2), 1932, pp. 201-210. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 L. J. Carr: “Disaster and the sequence-pattern concept of social change,” American Journal of Sociology, (38), 
(2), 1932, pp. 201-210. 
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outcome of a collision between a Norwegian relief freighter and a French munitions ship, 
containing a cargo of high explosives and barrels of flammable benzol – a normal yet 
dangerous shipment for wartime. Before the blast the French ship had caught fire following 
the accident, and burned for twenty five minutes, which allowed the crew of the ship to 
escape and take refuge on shore. The explosion caused great damage to the city, killing 
approximately 2000 people, injuring another 10 000 and until the invention and use of 
nuclear weapons, was considered the largest man-made explosion.
13
 The Braamfontein 
Explosion can be seen to fall within the same designation of an “instantaneous-diffused” 
disaster type, because it transpired and ended before anyone could act, and before anyone 
actually knew what had happened. While affected a large component of the community of 
Johannesburg, the effects of the blast decreased as the distance from the epicentre increased, 
thus it can also be considered that the explosion was an “instantaneous-focalised” type of 
disaster, as the main destruction was centred on three suburbs of the town, as will be seen 
later.  
 
Associated literature informs us that around 3:15 p.m. on 19 February 1896, within the 
railway yard of the Nederlandsche-Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij,
14
 hereafter 
the Railway Company, a train of ten trucks containing dynamite exploded.
15
 The yard was in 
the vicinity of Braamfontein Station, at the time known as Johannesburg Railway Station, 
with the train in question, stationed on one of the sidings. The explosion occurred after the 
dynamite trucks had been left on the siding for three days in the summer heat of February. 
After which it is believed by different sources that either a shunting train intended to move 
the trucks and the contact set off the consignment of „sun damaged dynamite‟; or that another 
set of trucks was being moved by the shunting train, and through an error crashed into the 
dynamite trucks, causing the explosion.
16
  The force of the explosion left a massive crater and 
practically destroyed every home and structure in the vicinity, leaving between 1500 and 
                                                 
13
 J. Kitz, “The Halifax Explosion, December 6, 1917,” Oral History Forum d'histoire orale, (12), 1992, p. 6. 
14
 English Translation: Netherlands South African Railway Company. 
15
 ZA HPRA A3353-1 – Johannes de Veer, Autobiography. Excerpt: Blumberg, J. G.: “The Great Dynamite 
Explosion”, Fairmount School, Johannesburg, p. 5.; J. Hyslop: "A Ragged Trousered Philanthropist and The 
Empire: Robert Tressell In South Africa," History Workshop Journal, vol. (2001), (51), 2001, pp. 64-86.  
16
 A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, 
p. 72.; H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, p. 128.; J. Davenport: “The Great Dynamite Explosion that 
Devastated a Fledgling Joburg”, Creamer Media’s Mining Weekly, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/the-
dynamite-explosion-that-devastated-a-fledgling-joburg-2015-01-23 (11 October 2016). 
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3000 homeless.
17
 The exact number of those killed by the blast was unknown as many were 
simply blown to pieces or “disappeared”.18 It is understood that most of the victims were 
women and children as most of the men were at work.
19
 The injured were cared for at many 
locations, while hospitals overflowed, the Wanderers became an infirmary and the 
Agricultural Show-Yard was organised to shelter the many homeless.
20
 The president wept, 
dignitaries sent condolences, a relief fund was set up and requests and inquiries were made.
21
 
The question to be asked is: what really caused the explosion? The most commonly held 
belief is that the aforementioned contact or collision with the shunting locomotive, in 
collaboration with the intensity of the three day heat was the cause.
22
 However when 
considering the chain of events that preceded the crash it becomes apparent that there might 
be more to the origins of this disaster than initially thought. The explosives on the train had 
come from the Zuid-Afrikaansche Fabrieken voor Ontplofbare Stoffen, hereafter the 
Dynamite Company, and were in fact cases of blasting gelatine and not regular dynamite.
23
 
This form of explosive was and is, in terms of explosives, considered one of the safest to 
transport, and which required detonators to be set off, which raises further questions about the 
cause.
24
  
 
In Hedley Chilvers‟s 1929 book about the early days of the Rand, he proposes a theory about 
the cause of the explosion, whereby he holds the Jameson Raid as indirectly accountable – by 
creating a situation that made it so the dynamite would have to remain at the station.
25
 
Chilvers discusses William Hosken, an uitlander and businessman on the Rand, who was 
                                                 
17
 ZA HPRA A3353-1 – Johannes de Veer, Autobiography. Excerpt: Blumberg, J. G.: “The Great Dynamite 
Explosion”, Fairmount School, Johannesburg, p.7.; Correspondent: The Cape Times, 21 February 1896, 
“Frightful Catastrophe at Johannesburg,” p. 5.; T. Gutsche: A Very Smart Medal: The Story of the 
Witwatersrand Agricultural Society, pp. 48-49. 
18
 A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, 
p. 71. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
Ibid.; ZA HPRA A3353-1 – Johannes de Veer, Autobiography. Excerpt: Blumberg, J. G.: “The Great 
Dynamite Explosion”, Fairmount School, Johannesburg, p. 7.; G. A. Leyds: A History of Johannesburg: The 
early years, p. 243. 
21
 R. Crisp: The Outlanders: The Men Who Made Johannesburg. 
22
 A. H. Smith, (ed.): Pictorial History of Johannesburg. p. 47.; ZA HPRA A3353-1 – Johannes de Veer, 
Autobiography. Excerpt: Blumberg, J. G.: “The Great Dynamite Explosion”, Fairmount School, Johannesburg, 
p. 5-7.; A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries 
Limited, p. 72. H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, p. 128. 
23
 A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, 
p. 71. 
24
 K. Fant: Alfred Nobel: A Biography, pp. 109-110. 
25
 H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, pp. 127-128. 
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representative of the dynamite giant Nobel, and an opponent of the dynamite concession. 
Although at a point he was on the board of the Dynamite Company, Hosken‟s feelings 
surrounding the unfair trade of dynamite would not subside and he joined the infamous 
Reform Committee that would be held accountable after the failed Jameson Raid of 
1895/1896. Before the events of the Raid, the Dynamite Company had been using dynamite 
magazines belonging to Hosken and following the events of the Raid, relations between him 
and the Dynamite Company were severed and the use of the magazines denied. The 
explosives establishment had other magazines but Chilvers implies that this loss of storage 
space created a situation whereby the dynamite that arrived from Leeuwfontein had no place 
to go, as the Company‟s magazines were possibly full at the time.26 This will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6.  
 
In a different account, Robert Crisp discussed a similar incident although very briefly. He 
wrote that there was an argument between the yard foremen and the Selling Agent‟s 
representative, who informed the foreman that the dynamite would have to stay on the train, 
as there was no space at the magazines. The representative further said, that as they were 
delivering dynamite frequently, space would be made available soon.
27
 There is no other 
mention of this discussion, however Crisp‟s work can often be described as indulgent. 
Further in this realm of causes and conditioning are the opinions of A. P. Cartwright, who 
notes the level of carelessness and recklessness when it came to the conduct involving 
explosives and how an accident was bound to occur.
28
 The State Mining Engineer J. Klimke, 
was convinced that most of the accidents on the mines were due to “negligence, 
incompetence and recklessness in the use of dynamite”29. Following his own investigations, 
he discovered that accidental explosions were the main cause of death and injuries in the 
mines, and were caused by misfires and dynamite being left lying around.
30
     
 
Anna H. Smith offers a more intriguing yet extremely brief conceptualisation of events where 
she attributes the explosion to “complications due to concessions and political 
undercurrents”, through which the dynamite trucks were left at the station. Although this is 
                                                 
26
 H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, pp. 127-128. 
27
 R. Crisp: The Outlanders: The Men Who Made Johannesburg. 
28
 A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, 
pp. 73-74. 
29
 E. N. Katz: “Revisiting the Origins of the Industrial Colour Bar in the Witwatersrand Gold Mining Industry, 
1891-1899,” Journal of Southern African Studies, (25), (1), March 1999,  p. 84. 
30
 Ibid. 
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promising it ends right there, as is probably expected from a pictorial history.
31
 Other 
literature alludes to, but never really addresses the fact that the presence of constant dynamite 
trains in the middle of the thickly populated suburbs was theme of contention.
32
 There were 
many controversial facets within the entire concession system of the Transvaal, and several 
will be touched on here. Yet the main role of this thesis is to discuss the causes of the 
explosion, thus these theories and stances are intriguing for that purpose, however at the 
moment they present a dated view of events.      
 
When one delves into the economic politics of Rand history, comments and discussions of 
the concessions are surely to present themselves. With regard to this research, the railway and 
dynamite concessions featured prominently and their roles within the disaster will become 
more visible later on. For decades now, scholars have discussed and identified the rivalry 
between Great Britain and Germany on the African continent, with special interests in South 
Africa after the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886). With their interests 
heightened, the two European powers sought to stamp their commercial influence over the 
mineral rich land, with its potential for wealth through commerce seemingly promising. 
Britain excelled in advancing its capital interests within the interior of South Africa through 
the British South African Company and its mining companies. While Germany, who did have 
a few mining interests, looked at other avenues, one being the successful acquisition of the 
railway monopoly in the Transvaal.
33
 However this was not the Germans entirely. The 
railway concession would be Dutch run but German financed. This concession, among 
others, became a contentious aspect that dramatically affected the relationship between the 
Transvaal and Britain.
34
 The same can be said about the Dynamite concession which was also 
a German affair – Chapter 2 discusses the Dynamite Company more thoroughly.35 These two 
concessions were an integral part of the mining industry, as dynamite was used to get to the 
gold, and the railway as a fast means of not only getting the dynamite to the mines, but also 
other supplies and machinery. The deeper miners had to go for gold, the more dynamite was 
                                                 
31
A. H. Smith, (ed.): Pictorial History of Johannesburg, p. 47. 
32
 Such as the mentioned literature by Cartwright and Chilvers. 
33
 J. J. Van Helten: "German Capital, The Netherlands Railway Company and the Political Economy of the 
Transvaal 1886–1900." The Journal of African History, (19), (03), 1978, pp. 369-368. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 C. T. Keto: "The aftermath of the Jameson Raid and American decision making in foreign affairs, 
1896." Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, (70), (8), 1980, p. 10. 
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needed, and with a fixed price the dynamite concession gained, while the mining companies 
had to pay more than what the explosives were worth at the time – but more on this later.36   
 
Rand history, as brought to us by Charles van Onselen, offers one of the most important and 
realistic looks into the social atmosphere that was being forged by the many forces arriving 
and already present.
37
 Johannesburg of the late 19
th
 Century was a toddler who immediately 
entered a rough adolescence, with greed and the promise of fortune as its mentors. There 
were no limits set for its social and economic growth, as well as the debauchery it could 
summon. The discovery of gold in 1886 made this all possible, yet it is the will of human-
beings that drive the practical endeavours of the imagination.
38
 To write about any historical 
event during the early stages of the city, one would certainly have to understand the context 
of the inner workings and social nature of its people and their industry. The explosion caused 
the most destruction in the suburbs of Braamfontein, Fordsburg, Vrededorp and the Location, 
and as such affected the working class and labour force and the unemployed.
39
 In hindsight 
1896 has been referred to as not being a „good year‟ for the people of the Rand and this will 
be discussed briefly later.
40
 Chilvers referred to the period of 1895/96 to 1899 as four years of 
drama, illustrating the complex and tumultuous atmosphere of the Rand.
41
   
 
There has only been one definitive work on the Braamfontein Explosion, and it is also the 
only academic article written about the event. The article by J.J. Fourie, is a brief yet 
comprehensive study of the explosion, and forms a good starting point for any further 
consideration.
42
 Furthermore there are small references, descriptions and eyewitness accounts 
of it in wider historical books and studies that discuss early Johannesburg and the early 
dynamite trade on the Rand.
43
 Journal articles and theses also mention the explosion but yet 
again in a minor role – one of the more recent mentions of the explosion was in 2001, in an 
academic article by Jonathan Hyslop, who briefly mentioned the event in passing while 
                                                 
36
 C. van Onselen: New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, p. 14.  
37
 Works such as: C. van Onselen: New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-
1914.; C. van Onselen. Showdown at the Red Lion: the life and times of Jack McLoughlin, 1859-1910. 
38
 C. van Onselen: New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, p. 2-3. 
39
 Ibid., pp. 5; 8; 145-146; 173. 
40
 A. H. Smith, (ed): Pictorial History of Johannesburg, p. 47. 
41
 H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, p. 125. 
42
 J.J. Fourie: “Die Dinamietontploffing te Braamfontein op 19 Februarie 1896,” Historia, (31), (2), 1986, pp. 
17-25. 
43
 A. P. Cartwright. The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited.; 
G. A. Leyds. A History of Johannesburg: The early years.; H. A. Chilvers. Out of the Crucible.; Like it was: The 
Star 100 years in Johannesburg.; A. H. Smith,(ed.): Pictorial History of Johannesburg.; A.J. Hoffman: Op die 
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explaining something else.
44
 Internet Sources hold the easiest access to information about the 
explosion, however these lack substantiation and credibility.
45
 Subsequently, the National 
Archives and National Libraries hold the most important information pertaining to this event.  
 
There exist small annoyances in some of the works, for example that of Cartwright and Crisp, 
with the former expressing the following: “The white population of the town grabbed its hat 
and rushed towards the railway station. The black population dropped whatever it was doing 
and rushed in the opposite direction.”46 Whether this is true or not, it offers an annoying 
interpretation of race consciousness. If the black population had run in any direction it would 
have been because their homes had been among those to bear the full brunt of the explosion. 
The „poor white‟ population, which had also suffered at the hand of the explosion, would 
have surely had their hats blown away. Thus, only the more affluent member of society, 
coming from the centre of town would have had a hat to wear at all.  Those from the centre of 
town did run towards the scenes of the explosion, with their hats already on, however it was 
more out of curiosity than an immediate desire to help their fellow man.  Yet on arrival to the 
terrible scenes among the townships, curiosity would evolve into an urgent need to do 
something.
47
 Peculiarly newspapers reported that “all nationalities and races [were] merged in 
one grand endeavour to do their best for the survivors” and that there was little discrimination 
in the subsequent medical treatment.
48
 Crisp on the other hand presents a very Uitlander-
centric view in his work.
49
 Therefore it can be seen that existing literature concerning the 
Braamfontein Explosion, is old and out-dated. This thesis will hopefully be the starting point 
for further research into this topic or on the other hand present the lack of significance in this 
event.  
                                                 
44
 J. Hyslop: "A Ragged Trousered Philanthropist and the Empire: Robert Tressell in South Africa," History 
Workshop Journal, (51), (2001), 2001, p. 74.; V. Horler: “Gone With the Shining Things”, (Master‟s Thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 2013). 
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Methodology 
The title
50
 of this thesis is taken from the testimonies of Robert Bell and Thomas Lent, who 
both begin their testimonies with these words.
51
 It illustrates the attitudes of those who 
experienced the explosion, in that most did not know what occurred and that those who were 
directly involved, always attempted to avert blame from themselves by claiming they knew 
nothing or very little. Bell and Lent were not directly involved, but the phrase still seemed 
appropriate. The quote is also in reference to the fact that not many people today have heard 
of the explosion and those who have, do not know very much, but a survey would have to be 
carried out to obtain statistical data pertaining to public knowledge of this event. 
 
The National Archives Repository in Pretoria (formerly the Transvaal Archives Repository) 
had the most available primary sources pertaining to the event. One document in particular 
that was significant, was the minutes of the Commission of Inquiry, both the hand-written 
and officially typed version.
52
 Along with the hand written report were other documents 
relating to the investigation, which formed a small collection that was gathered by the 
commission. This included sketches, telegrams, charts and receipts. It is always difficult 
when one confronts an event that took place over a 100 years ago, when there are no longer 
any witnesses alive to interview. However, this also cuts out the difficulties involved in 
personal communication with interviewees. The lack of specific secondary sources also make 
matters difficult when initial research is done and for the review of. Fortunately, the existence 
of primary sources such as recorded testimonies, make matters easier as well as intriguing. 
The testimonies are crucial primary sources, yet they are susceptible to human error, as they 
are conveyed by a human, interpreted by a human and then rewritten or typed by another 
human. A few of the witnesses needed to have an interpreter present as well, further adding a 
buffer between sources. The scope for error was possible and is visible in the minutes of the 
Commission of Inquiry, where often a surname would be misspelt or other spelling mistakes 
made. This is a minor technical offense, but it does plant doubt in the mind of the researcher 
and creates the suspicion that there may be more mistakes. However, the mistake itself is a 
source. The biggest obstacle was that most of the primary sources were in Dutch, and as the 
                                                 
50
 “Ik Weet Niets van de Onploffing” (Dutch) – Translated: “I know nothing about the explosion”. 
51
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researcher had no experience with this language, the ability to engage with the text was 
decelerated. Translating the text was done by the researcher using translation software, which 
was quite useful, yet time consuming and not free from error. The desired sources were 
however translated and used.  
 
Secondary sources were not used in abundance here, as there are very few that discuss the 
disaster comprehensively. Even more modern and thorough studies fail to mention the 
explosion.
53
 Secondary sources used were thus concerned with the commerce of the Rand, in 
particular the concessions of the Railway and Dynamite Companies.
54
 Social histories too 
were consulted for their in depth discussions on the people of the Rand, specifically the 
people that lived in the suburbs that were most affected by the explosion.
55
       
   
Newspapers were valued primary source, as their “threefold value” came into play.56 Tosh 
explains that newspapers can inform the historian of the social and political views that were 
relevant at the time in question.
57
 They can also provide a journal-like account of daily 
happenings, which are instrumental to historians who wish to recount the lives of people or 
their social environment.
58
 These conditions were bolstered with the invention and use of 
telegrams in the late 1800s, where reports could be sent by correspondents in the field to their 
respective newspapers – such was the case with many reports used in this thesis. Lastly Tosh 
states, that newspapers occasionally present the findings of other more thorough 
investigations, which garner more accountability and scope than the average news report. It 
will become apparent that all three of these aspects would apply to the research and 
understanding within this investigation.
59
 However newspapers do offer problems as well, in 
the form of their desire to publish the news as soon as possible, the prevalence of 
sensationalism in certain publications and the existence of editorial bias influencing what is 
published.
60
 Through source criticism and being cautious researchers can overcome these 
challenges in collaboration with the examining of the full range of a story‟s coverage as well 
as by consulting different newspapers. As should be expected many would consider The Star 
                                                 
53
 For example, works by Charles van Onselen.   
54
 As such The Dynamite Company by A. P. Cartwright.  
55
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56
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57
 Ibid. 
58
 Ibid., p. 38. 
59
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60
 J. Baumgartner, “Newspapers as Historical Sources.” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society, (9), (3), 
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to be a prime newspaper resource and rightfully so, however it was not directly consulted in 
this thesis as the material was syndicated and replicated.
61
  
 
The thesis unpacks the events and knowledge associated with the explosion in a linear way, 
attempting to create an informed narrative of the disaster, while still being analytical with 
regards to the sources. It discusses the activities of the 19
th
 of February, via the perspectives 
of those who were directly involved and those who witnessed the explosion, seen through the 
testimonies given afterwards and newspaper reports during. Secondary literature frames the 
event within the setting of the expanding Witwatersrand, accompanied with its complex 
features of social and economic politics.        
                                                 
61
 The Cape Argus, 26 February 1896, “Rand Calamity,” p. 5.; A. H. Smith, (ed): Pictorial History of 
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Chapter 2: From the Sea to a “Nauseous Pit of Death”1 
Transvaal Dynamite 
“The dynamite had been imported in bulk and made into cartridges in 
Pretoria, passing thenceforward as Transvaal-made dynamite.”2 
To understand the origins of the Braamfontein Explosion, it is necessary to understand the 
origins of the dynamite itself. There is one man that the early history of dynamite on the Rand 
cannot be detached from – Eduard Lippert. As someone who has an asteroid named in his 
honour, Edouard or Eduard Lippert was no stranger to good fortune or reaping what he 
sowed, at least when it came to matters of business and accumulating wealth.
3
 Lippert was 
born in Hamburg, Germany in 1844, but it is his exploits in Southern Africa that bring him to 
the attention of this thesis.  He has been described as a “predator”, “a concession-hunter” and 
as “one of the most unsavoury financiers who left many traces in Southern Africa”.4 
However, in an alternative and more favourable light in the Transvaal, he was known for his 
wide variety of business activities, for his personal charm and had ties to President Kruger.
5
 
After a stint with various merchant houses in London and New York, Lippert joined his 
family‟s business, David Lippert & Co. and became its representative in Port Elizabeth. The 
company, though at first successful, was however liquidated in 1883 after major losses in the 
Cape. Lippert then bought the company‟s South African division but his interests in 
commerce eventually lead him north of the Vaal River.
6
 
 
As soon as pickaxes and panning could no longer effectively render the precious golden ore 
vulnerable, new and creative ways had to be thought up or borrowed from prospectors 
outside of the Rand. Dynamite subsequently began to play a part, and acquiring it became a 
concern – a growing demand was created and wherever there is a demand for something and 
there exists a means to pay for it, there will be various suppliers around the corner. The Rand 
                                                 
1
 www.blueplaques.co.za/article/nauseous-pit-death-%E2%80%93-braamfontein-dynamite-explosion (20 March 
2015). 
2
 “The Latest Intelligence – The Johannesburg Explosion,” The Times (London, England), 22 February 1896, p. 
7. 
3
 Joerg Bauer: The Flight of the Phoenix: Investing in Zimbabwe’s Rise from the Ashes during the Global Debt 
Crisis. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 J. S. Marais: The Fall of Kruger's Republic, p. 28. 
6
 Joerg Bauer: The Flight of the Phoenix: Investing in Zimbabwe’s Rise from the Ashes during the Global Debt 
Crisis.; M. Meredith: Diamonds, gold, and war: The British, the Boers, and the making of South Africa, pp. 276-
278.  
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soon became an excellent market for the sale of dynamite.
7
 However there is always a bigger 
fish and the Rand was well known for this proverbial truth, as there was continually an 
evolution within the operation of its commerce.
8
 Prospectors vanished, Randlords appeared 
and monopolies became the talk of the town.
9
 One such monopoly was that of the dynamite 
trade, and here Lippert played an influential and direct role. Before 1896 there were no high 
explosives manufactured in the Transvaal, and the large amounts that were being used in the 
mines were imported either via Kimberley or Durban.
10
 It is the dynamite that came via the 
sea from which played a significant part in the Braamfontein Explosion.  
 
In 1887 Lippert was awarded the highly profitable dynamite concession – a monopoly on the 
importing, manufacturing and trade of dynamite on the Witwatersrand.
11
 Lippert, like many 
other concessionaires, intended to sell his monopoly. He approached both the German and 
French dynamite associations of the Nobel organisation, but the former turned down the offer 
due to a price discrepancy, while the French accepted the offer.
12
 On December 31, 1887 
Lippert was given the authority to establish a dynamite company, the Zuid-Afrikaansche 
Maatschappij van Ontplofbare Stoffen, and immediately planned to build a factory for the 
means of its production. The production of the dynamite however was a farce. The factory 
had machinery and trained workers, but not for the purpose of making dynamite – merely the 
manufacturing art of reshaping and packaging it. The French supplied the explosives in 
blocks and Lippert‟s factory shaped them into cartridges, packaged them with Dynamite 
Company labels and packed them into cases.
13
  
 
Lippert or rather the Dynamite Company had such a factory in Leeuwfontein, here the 
cartridges were wrapped in paper that had been soaked in paraffin, before being labelled and 
                                                 
7
 J. S. Marais: The Fall of Kruger's Republic, pp. 27-28. 
8
 C. van Onselen: New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, p. 2. 
9
 Ibid.; A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries 
Limited, p. 70. 
10
 J. S. Marais: The Fall of Kruger's Republic, p. 28.; A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of 
African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, p. 45. 
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placed in bags which were in turn placed in cases – five bags per case.14 A case cost the Rand 
mines £7 10s, when it cost the Dynamite Company only about 18s to make. The entire 
operation was a monopolist‟s fantasy. The Dynamite Company made a profit of about a £3 
10s to £4 – after charges including transport, Lippert‟s commission and the 2s royalty to the 
State.
15
 
 
Lambertus G. Vorstmann, an official at the Nederlandsche Bank, who had no real knowledge 
of dynamite, was appointed as managing director while Lippert was made the sole general 
agent for the sale of the company‟s products.16 The operation which was clearly a scheme, 
although attempts to hide the reality of it were frequently carried out, was opposed by nearly 
everyone who had a stake in mining or who could have had a stake in the dynamite trade. The 
Chamber of Mines was the most vocal, followed by other dynamite importers who rightfully 
felt robbed and even consuls of various European states were calling foul. However, the 
company was allowed to continue – for the time being that is.17  
 
Yet by 1892, the British had had enough and presented an official complaint to the Transvaal 
government, in which it firmly specified that the dynamite concession was a breach of the 
London Convention of 1883. The convention stipulated that the Transvaal had to safeguard 
the rights of British citizens, and ensure that there was to be no unfair trade or favouritism 
that would be harmful to their interests. The German Government also lodged a complaint. It 
would be the latter who gained from this.
18
 The combined efforts of the government 
representatives and the influential voices of the mining industry forced President Kruger to 
act and the Dynamite Company was told that its contract was cancelled because it did not 
maintain its obligations to the Transvaal. Immediately the French government reacted with 
demands that their national‟s company be compensated and that there should be arbitrational 
action concerning this matter. The French government‟s words were well misplaced because 
                                                 
14
 Friedrich Krieger. Testimony given at the Commission of Inquiry. 11 March 1896, TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – 
Notulen van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 12-13. 
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 A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited. 
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Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited, p. 46.  
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p. 48. 
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1896." Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, (70), (8), 1980, p. 10.; C. D. Penner: "Germany and 
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if any government deserved compensation it was that of the Transvaal. Yet, the mess was 
made and the Transvaal had to figure out what to do.
19
 The international dynamite trade 
however, was shrouded in irony. 
 
As was said earlier, the French company supplying Lippert and the company was a subsidiary 
of the Nobel Corporation. Additionally, the protests made by the British government were on 
the behalf of the Britain‟s Nobel Company, and the German Government‟s actions were on 
behalf of the German Nobel company. These Nobel company entities were not completely 
separate, but members of the same Nobel Trust, with a bond signed in ink. It is therefore 
ironic that there were protests and a level of bad blood in the first place, as all the major 
dynamite players were in the same boat. Perhaps the excitement surrounding the 
Witwatersrand was too much too handle for the Nobel dynamite family. It can thus be seen as 
a matter of indifference among the Nobel companies although still an unfair monopoly in the 
broader sense.
20
 
 
The response of the Transvaal was to allow the import of dynamite under a permit system and 
dynamite flowed equally from France, Germany and England.
21
 This created healthy 
competing among the explosives agencies and the Chamber of Mines was pleased. The 
permit system was short lived however as Kruger‟s government wanted to come up with a 
way to avoid the London Convention for the time being, while they were planning to build a 
dynamite factory for the Transvaal. A solution was reached and in September 1893. The 
Volksraad passed a resolution where it made future importing, manufacturing and the sale of 
high explosives a Transvaal government monopoly. This allowed the government to transfer 
their monopoly to other individuals and they chose Vorstman, the former managing director 
of the very Dynamite Company whose contract was cancelled by the same government. 
Vorstman‟s selection was possibly a means to appease the annoyed French shareholders – 
which was already simplified by a private agreement between the Nobel trusts.
22
                       
 
The agreement changed very little, as the only difference was that the French connection 
seemed to fall away, while German involvement increased. Evermore ironic was the fact that 
                                                 
19
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the new explosives company‟s shares were basically divided equally between companies 
owned by the Nobel Dynamite Trust and the Société Centrale de Dynamite. The French 
received these shares as a settlement for their earlier discontent and claims for compensation 
for their previous contract. Shares were being handed out to all those who „needed to be 
compensated‟, and among these was the ever fortunate Lippert, receiving 25 000 shares for 
his lost commission and royalties.
23
 The price of a case of No. 1 dynamite was now fixed at a 
height of £5, upon which the Transvaal government made a royalty of 5s a case. Smaller 
importers who could now ship in their explosives had to contend with the fact that they were 
competing with government manufacturing and therefore had to pay a special duty of 9d on a 
pound of dynamite, additionally to the normal value added tax they already paid. This 
equalled a duty of 37s 6d a case and severely obstructed the chances of these importers to 
turn a profit.
24
    
    
In 1893, when the Volksraad passed the resolution that enabled this monopoly, it had 
intended that the selected company to manufacture its explosives should within the shortest 
possible time, with a maximum of two and a half years, establish a dynamite factory that 
could meet the requirements of the Republic. The Transvaal government however altered this 
condition without the knowledge of the Volksraad.
25
 The alteration still mentioned the two 
and a half years‟ limit but it now allowed for an extension for the completion of the factory to 
be determined by the government at regular intervals. Therefore, until the time by which the 
factory was completed, the government was to import explosives itself, through its agent. The 
Volksraad‟s intention was for all imports of explosives to end after the two and half years, 
but this was not to be.
26
  
 
In reality Vorstman would be the acting agent of the government and acquired dynamite from 
the German manufacturers. This dynamite in turn was sold to the mine owners, with a profit 
of £2 a case, minus royalties and commissions, to the company. With the ever growing 
demand for explosives on the Rand, this became a very profitable business, and the 
executives of the new Dynamite Company did everything they could to ensure its survival for 
the next six years. Lippert made an appearance once again as the company‟s selling agent, 
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and received the characteristic royalty and commission on every case sold. In June 1894, the 
new dynamite company, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Fabrieken voor Ontplofbare Stoffen Beperkt, 
was established – with no real changes made to the original name of the company.27   
    
It has been asked how the dynamite monopoly, which was loathed by so many including the 
Volksraad, managed to survived for as long as it did. The Transvaal concessions commission, 
set up by the British in 1900, concluded that it all came down to bribery and in a few cases 
money or shares were exchanged, but this alone did not enable this survival. President Kruger 
and State Secretary Leyds were not swayed by financial gain, and defended the monopoly as 
the “corner-stone of the independence of the republic”.28 Additionally and more to the point 
was, that Kruger and Leyds considered it crucial to have „capitalist allies‟ who they could 
depend on to be a counterbalance against those other capitalists they deemed to be enemies of 
the republic – this included the mining magnates. Economically the Dynamite Company and 
the Railway Company were the Transvaal‟s strongest allies, who could be called upon in a 
financial crisis or “embarrassment” to assist, and in fact on occasion they did.29 With this in 
mind, it would have been misguided for Kruger to terminate the presence of the monopolies 
from his point of view and they thus survived for the time being. 
 
This sets up the context and origin of the dynamite in question. One specific characteristic of 
the dynamite on the train was that it was not the No. 1 dynamite mentioned above, but the 
more powerful and safer blasting gelatine, a variant of dynamite.
30
  These parties are 
discussed, because they would be involved in the subsequent investigation following the 
explosion – specifically the Dynamite Company and the office of Lippert. What is established 
here, is that the dynamite was an import from Germany; it was shaped and repackaged at 
Leeuwfontein and sent via train to the Rand, specifically Park Station. What can be added is 
when the train arrived at the station, there was no one to collect it as it was a Sunday 
afternoon. It was therefore moved to a Braamfontein Station siding until further notice or 
movement.  
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The Small Matter of £3 
The Nederlandsche-Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij (NZASM) or Netherlands 
South African Railway Company was another establishment that had been blessed with the 
joys of a concession from the Transvaal. The Railway Company was founded in 1887, by a 
group of Dutch bankers and financiers, under the blessing of President Kruger who always 
felt that the Dutch had the best interests of the Transvaal at heart.
31
 The Railway Company 
was however financed by Germans, who Kruger also had large amount of faith in.
32
 The 
Company enjoyed the profit gains of fixed rates, and would not consider co-operating with 
the mines because this would be negative for profits.
33
 The Railway Order Service was the 
delivery arm of the Railway Company, and distributed the goods throughout the city, by mule 
or horse drawn wagons – of which the Order Service had a total of 260 wagons.    
 
The dynamite left Leeuwfontein by train, headed towards the Dynamite Company‟s selling 
agent Edouard Lippert in Johannesburg. Lippert‟s office had been informed by management 
at Leeuwfontein that the dynamite would arrive by Monday morning. To the knowledge of 
the Railway Company it was to arrive on either Saturday the 15
th
 or Sunday the 16
th
 of 
February – on Sunday evening it was confirmed by them that it had arrived.34 The dynamite 
had to be collected by the Order Service and delivered to the magazines via the mule wagons. 
It took about ten minutes to travel from the Railway Company barracks to Braamfontein 
station, and another twenty minutes from the station to the dynamite magazines near 
Auckland Park. Five of the magazines were already holding dynamite, amounting to roughly 
6500 cases.
35
 
 
On the morning of Monday, February 17
th
 1896, the Railway Order Service received an order 
from the Chief of the Railway Company Barracks, to collect and deliver the dynamite that 
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was on board the goods train at the Station. The Order Service sent five wagons under the 
agreement that there would be labourers to offload and load the dynamite, and a loading 
master. The Order Service eventually sent their own loading master, a man known as Clemm, 
and an auditor, with the wagons at around 9:35 a.m. The labourers arrived at 10:00 a.m. and 
the dynamite was loaded and eventually on its way to the dynamite magazines. Around 11:30 
a.m., Clemm returned alone to the Service‟s offices and reported that there was no one at the 
magazines to receive the dynamite. The head of staff instructed him to return to the 
magazines and to wait for someone who could take delivery of it. At 1:00 p.m., Clemm came 
back and reported that there was still no one there, that he had already returned the dynamite 
to the railway yard and that it was back on the train.
36
 One of the wagon drivers said that 
Clemm reloaded the dynamite onto the train himself without an official from the Railway 
Company.
37
 On Tuesday the Order Service was yet again contacted by the Stationmaster of 
the Railway Company barracks, who requested that wagons be sent to collect the dynamite. 
The employee who received the request did not send any wagons, as he had received no 
instructions from his superiors who were currently concerned with and involved in strained 
deliberations with Lippert‟s office over a payment of £3.38  
 
That Monday afternoon, Edward Jacobs, director of the Railway Order Service, paid a visit to 
the Chief of the Railway Barracks, and spoke to his first captain inquiring about the 
procedure regarding the returning and thus delay of the dynamite delivery. On Tuesday 
morning, he returned to the barracks and asked the captain who would have to pay for the 
delay. The captain told him that the consignee would have to pay – the consignee is the 
person responsible for the receipt of a shipment.
39
 In this case Jacobs saw Lippert as the 
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consignee, and went to his office to find out what he planned to do. He arrived at around nine 
o‟clock and found William Langley there, a magazine caretaker for Lippert, and queried as to 
who would pay for the delay. Langley replied that they would not pay for a service not 
rendered. Jacobs then told him that it would be best that Lippert dealt directly with the 
Railway Company, and that he refused to send any wagon until the matter was resolved. 
According to its rules, the Railway Company was responsible for payment, however when 
goods are ordered, not received and have to be reordered then the consignee has to pay, 
“immediately and directly” to the Order Service.40 The exact contract further stated that this 
only applied with a certain tonnage, within a particular radius, and then the consignee would 
have to pay directly. The difference of the payment in this case was £3.
41
 In today‟s terms the 
relative value of £3 from 1896 would be around £313.10.
42
           
 
William Langley, a magazine caretaker for Lippert, had a slightly different version of the 
story to tell. According to him, he and Alexander Powell, an assistant caretaker, were at the 
magazines from 10 until after 12 on Monday the 17
th, at which time they returned to Lippert‟s 
office in the city. Langley and Powell returned to them at around 2:20 p.m., this is supported 
by Powell‟s testimony, and there was still no sign of the wagons. They remained there until 5 
o‟clock and returned to the office.43 The Tuesday when Jacobs visited the office and queried 
about their absence at the magazines, Langley replied that no wagons came. Jacobs explained 
that the wagons were sent at around nine o‟clock to which Langley quipped that it was 
impossible that the wagons had not arrived yet, if they had left so early the previous day. 
After Jacobs left the office, Langley went to see Arthur Rutherford the senior magazine 
caretaker for Lippert and the head of the office, who told him to immediately return to the 
magazines, but to first telephone the Order Service. Langley did so and asked if the dynamite 
could be delivered again that day, the reply oddly enough said „yes, certainly‟ however no 
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dynamite would be sent.
44
 Langley and Powell waited at the magazine from 2:15 p.m. to 4:45 
p.m., before returning to the office.
45
     
 
The magazines usually received dynamite on a Monday morning from 9:45, with the average 
amount being around 1600 cases, and the rest being delivered on Tuesdays. Occasionally 
they would receive the whole amount of dynamite on the Monday, if the delivery was 
smaller. Unloading the dynamite began at 10:05 a.m. and lunch was taken from 1p.m. to 2:30 
p.m., with work being resumed at 2:45 p.m. until 5 p.m. At night, the magazines were not 
supervised by anyone, but were locked and the keys kept within a safe at the office. Lippert‟s 
magazine master had been sick with typhus fever since June 1895, and was therefore not 
present at the time of the explosion.
46
 Later he was to be replaced with someone who could 
assist Langley – it is possible that Powell was his replacement, as he had only been working 
at the magazine for a month at the time of the explosion.
47
       
 
There is a varying degree of conflicting information with regard to the delivery or rather non-
delivery of the dynamite to the magazines on the Monday and Tuesday in question. However, 
this does not distort the real points, which is that there was a level of animosity between the 
Railway Order Service or the Railway Company itself and the office of Eduard Lippert. This 
was not the first time that there had been an issue with a dynamite delivery, as it was 
indicated that in December 1895, Lippert refused to accept a delivery because he maintained 
that he had not ordered it and the shipment was thus returned.
48
 In another incident, Lippert 
filed a complaint against the Order Service, when his magazine caretakers had waited most of 
the day for a delivery which only arrived at 3:30 p.m., an hour and a half before the 
magazines and offices closed. After the complaint deliveries were on time.
 49
 There was 
another minor disagreement, between Jacobs and Rutherford over the delivering schedule. 
Delays were occurring and Jacobs wanted to start delivering at 6 am, and asked Rutherford if 
                                                 
44
 Langley: “Ja, beslis.”; Rutherford: “Ja seker.” 
45
 William Langley. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 5 March 1896.; Arthur Rutherford. Testimony 
given at Commission of Inquiry. 5 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen van de Commissie van Onderzoek 
in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 7-9. 
46
 Thomas Bailie. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 13 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen van 
de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 25-26. 
47
 Ibid.; Alexander Powell. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 5 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – 
Notulen van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, p. 10. 
48
 Edward Jacobs. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 12 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen 
van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 18-20. 
49
 William Langley. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 5 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen 
van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 7-9 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
22 
 
this would be possible. Rutherford refused to allow this as it was not „convenient‟ for him, 
because the keys were locked in the office safe and he only got to the office around 9 a.m.
50
 
The junior caretakers were not allowed to collect the keys themselves – perhaps the only 
good precaution.
51
 Allowing deliveries to commence at 6 a.m. would have permitted more 
time for unloading at the magazines and a shorter period of time that the dynamite would 
have had to stay at the station.  
 
The confirmation that a dynamite delivery would be sent and then was not, was a detestable 
move by the Order Company – this refers to the afternoon of Monday 17th, when Langley 
telephoned the service and requested the dynamite to be sent again, and a clerk replied „yes, 
certainly‟. The dynamite was not delivered, as Jacobs was clear in his position of no delivery 
until the £3 was paid.
52
 The question is, why would the clerk say this? It is possible he did not 
know about Jacob‟s proclamation and later when he learnt about it he did nothing, or was he 
merely being obnoxious?  
 
There is also the behaviour and accusations of Langley. By 1896, William Langley had been 
working for Lippert for three years as a junior magazine caretaker, and has come across as a 
man with no small amount of wit and humour.
53
 However there were allegations made 
against him, by one of the Order Service drivers, known only as Fortuin, who said that 
Langley promised to pay him £50 if he would say that he was at the explosion. According to 
him, he saw Langley at the offices of Peycke & Co., where Langley promised him the £50 
but he refused.
54
 However there is no other record or testimony of this other than the 
Fortuin‟s testimony and identification of Langley during the Commission of Inquiry. Langley 
acknowledged that he spoke to the other drivers on the following Saturday, but that he did not 
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know Fortuin at all and that he was never at the offices of Peycke & Co.
55
 Why would 
Fortuin fabricate something like this, yet on the other hand why would Langley offer to pay 
him to say he was at an explosion that half the city witnessed? Langley came into contact 
with two other drivers following the explosion, who were both reasonably close to the 
explosion and who both appeared to come out of the blast virtually unscathed – wagon and 
dynamite intact.
56
  
 
Perhaps there is a deeper link to this and the accusations of Fortuin, in that these drivers 
miraculously survived the explosion, when other drivers did not. According to a newspaper 
report, Fortuin claimed that Langley offered to pay him and the other drivers £50 if they said 
that they were not at the magazines on Monday the 17
th
 of February.
57
 As stated in the 
minutes of the Commission of Inquiry, Fortuin said that Langley offered him the money to 
say that he was at the explosion, and he refused. These alternate descriptions cause confusion 
as to what was said and furthermore why it was said. Both versions create questions. In the 
newspaper account it seems like an attempt by Langley to clear his name, for his absence at 
the magazines on the Monday. The interpretation in the Commission Minutes could very well 
be wrong or misinterpreted, as in many cases an interpreter was present.
58
  
  
Ultimately Fortuin‟s testimony was not very clear and he was not specific about when he 
actually saw Langley – whether it was on the Monday or the Saturday.59 These reasons could 
be why the Committee, who carried out the investigation, did not follow up on this, as it was 
simply a case of Langley‟s word against Fortuin‟s. Still, there is a cloud of suspicion that 
shrouds Langley. He became by default the more senior caretaker who would be physically 
present at the magazines, after the absence of the chief caretaker due to typhus fever, and it 
can be assumed based on the evidence that Langley was not as responsible as he should have 
been.
60
 For one, where was he when the dynamite was being delivered on the Monday? Yet 
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whether or not Langley was present at the magazines, Clemm who was tasked with delivering 
the dynamite should have shown more patience in his waiting for someone to receive it. 
Clemm also showed a lack of concern when he repacked the dynamite himself, without the 
presence of a railway official. It is clear that employees from both the Railway Order Service 
and the office of Lippert had acted negligently with regard to their respective tasks; 
moreover, the management of both of the offices did not act accordingly either.      
 
By Wednesday morning negotiations or rather debates surrounding the £3 persisted. Jacobus 
Pfennig, the clerk responsible for the Railway Company‟s barracks, was sent to Lippert to 
once again inquire about the payment, and the dynamite agent‟s office again refused. Pfennig 
threatened to send the dynamite back to Pretoria and Rutherford exclaimed that he did not 
care what happened to the dynamite.
61
 It was Corneille Plate, an official at the Railway 
Company, who finally broke the deadlock, and urged the Order Service to deliver the 
dynamite and to forget about the £3, which was to be paid by the Railway Company.
62
 
Initially Plate was unsure who had to pay the £3 for the delay, but under the circumstances he 
came to the decision that the dynamite should be delivered to Lippert and the Railway 
Company should pay the Order Service.
63
 Clemm and his men returned to the siding to 
unload the dynamite onto the mule wagons and once again commence delivery.
64
 
 
 
Shunting the Mistakes 
“De wissel was verkeerd.”65 – Jacob Bloom, Machinist (driver) for the 
Railway Company.
66
 
Jacob Bloom had been a locomotive driver with the Railway Company for three years by 
1896, and had focussed primarily on shunting work. Shunting is the task of pushing or 
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pulling a train or part of a train, from the main track onto a siding or alternative track, using a 
locomotive. Around the same time that Clemm was underway with the unpacking of the 
dynamite, Bloom was to shunt 31 empty of trucks onto one of the three sidings available at 
Braamfontein Station. With him was Joseph Williams, a shunter, Hendrik Vermeulen, also a 
shunter, Matthijs Pienaar, the stoker, and Sydney Oxer, the foreman-shunter.
67
 Of the three 
sidings at the station, two were occupied with trucks. From the east, the direction which 
Bloom‟s train faced, the trucks containing the dynamite were on the right-hand siding; on the 
middle siding were trucks belonging to Cassel Collieries, and contained coal and other 
goods.
68
 On the left was the open siding for the empty trucks to be shunted on. In the vicinity 
of the station was a timber mill belonging to the Rand Timber Co., with the train track curved 
slightly around the mill‟s shed. This track linked with another main track which ran from 
central Johannesburg, towards the railway yard. In front of the sidings was a road that ran 
across the train track from north to south and formed a crossing there. There was routinely a 
policeman on duty at this crossing, and the 19
th
 was no different.
69
 At the apex of the bend 
around the timber mill was a large pile of wood (see Appendix 1). The empty trucks stood 50 
yards from the mill at the goods station/shed where they were most likely unloaded.
70
  
 
The crew operating the shunting locomotive had a mixed bag of experience and service with 
the Railway Company – Bloom had been with the company for three years; Williams, five 
years; Vermeulen, around seven months; and Pienaar only a few weeks – starting in 
February. Oxer claimed to be the most experienced crew member, yet the length of his tenure 
is not known – the others stated their work period at the Commission of Inquiry, Oxer did 
not.
71
 After the shunters connected and prepared the trucks for shunting, Bloom moved in the 
steam powered machine and gently began to nudge the trucks, before building up a slight 
amount of speed to push them. The normal speed for shunting was four to six miles per hour, 
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as was the regulations of the Railway Company – Bloom testified to bringing the train to a 
speed of two miles per hour, equivalent to 3.2 kilometres per hour. This speed was confirmed 
by the others who were on the locomotive. Trains went at a slower speed around the timber 
mill towards the sidings as there was slight slope down this direction, and drivers needed to 
be more cautious. This was a fairly mundane and ordinary operation for the crew, who would 
have done this several times a week and thus, would have been quite efficient at this, and 
most of them had been involved with the shunting of these dynamite trucks, just a few days 
before.
72
 The locomotive used was a NZASM 40 Tonner 0-6-2T, a model which was used 
widely during this time.
73
 Its identification number was thirteen (needless to mention the 
superstitious implications of that), and was said to be in a good condition, with an impeccable 
brake.
74
   
 
The ten dynamite trucks that arrived on Sunday afternoon were open topped, scantily covered 
with sails, while only two were covered with iron. That the dynamite arrived on Sunday 
could be a reason why no one collected it initially. The sidings were usually locked when 
trucks containing dynamite stood on them, but it was common for the lock to either be stolen 
or broken, and for the last three weeks, prior to the 19
th
, it had not been replaced.
75
 The siding 
was built at the end of 1890, crossing over into 1891, and was quickly put to use.
76
 Trucks 
that were stationed on the siding were unconventionally, secured by a large rock, on the side 
facing west, towards Krugersdorp. The rock would be placed so that the trucks would not roll 
any further forward – after this there was a „stop-block‟ to further ensure the trucks from 
rolling away, however if dynamite was being unloaded, the trucks would not be pushed as far 
as the „stop-block‟. Additionally when any unloading was being done on the siding, another 
rock would be placed on the Eastern side, facing Johannesburg, so that the trucks would not 
roll backwards, which would have just been precautionary as backwards would have been up 
the slope.
77
 The trucks were usually disengaged from their locomotive on either a Sunday or a 
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Monday. As was said earlier, the station/railway yard was surrounded by various populated 
areas, namely Vrededorp, Fordsburg, the Brickfields and the various locations within these – 
the Indian, African, and Malay locations.
78
  
 
As foreman-shunter, Oxer was responsible for delegating work to the other shunters, namely 
Williams and Vermeulen in this case, while taking on most of the work himself, which he felt 
was correct because he had the most experience. He also claimed to not always follow the 
rules, stating that he did not understand the language but that nevertheless he was proficient 
at shunting. Included in his responsibilities was overseeing the railway turnout or switch, 
called a „wissel‟ in Dutch, which is the mechanism that enables trains to be steered from one 
track onto another that is headed in a different direction or onto a siding (see Appendix 2 for 
the sketch of the railway switch mechanism).
79
 The switch could be adjusted to lead a train 
on to any one of the three sidings at the station. On the 19
th
, Oxer instructed Williams to 
prepare the empty trucks for shunting, to ensure that the railway switch was correctly set, and 
to position himself near the front of the trucks so that he could he see any possible hazards 
during the shunting. It was common to have someone near the front of the train as a lookout, 
because the locomotive would be pushing the trucks from behind. Oxer ensured this so that 
the responsibility would not be on him.
80
  At around 2:30 p.m. Williams with Vermeulen, left 
the switch to prepare the trucks, and both noted that it was in order. Williams also 
remembered that there was a labourer cleaning the switch, or near to it.
81
 Bloom also stated 
seeing this labourer cleaning the switch around this time, while on his way to collect the 
trucks, but he did not inspect the switch as it was not his responsibility, and he took that fact 
well to heart, as did most of the Railway Company employees – if it was not their 
responsibility they washed their hands of a task or were oblivious to it.
82
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Once the crew were ready to get under-way, the movement began, and Williams gave the 
signal to cross over onto the siding, and then climbed onto the fourth truck while it was in 
motion. The bend at the timber mill obscured the line of sight of those who were on the 
locomotive, as did the pile of timber. Going at two miles an hour, the train had just crossed 
over the switch when there was another signal and a shout from Williams to stop. No one on 
board the locomotive heard the signal to stop or saw Williams‟s raised hand indicating the 
same. Bloom who at first could not see the switch or the crossing eventually saw that he was 
on the wrong siding and immediately told the stoker to apply the brake, but it was too late 
and the train crashed into the dynamite trucks. Even though the brakes reacted immediately, a 
train does not come to a stop immediately, and adding to this was the weight of the 31 trucks. 
The switch was therefore incorrectly set, as it lead the train onto the dynamite siding instead 
of the empty siding, as was intended.
83
  
 
The foreman of the timber mill was observing the shunters going about their business. Earlier 
in the day he had commented to Oxer, who was busy with the coal trucks at the time, to be 
careful while shunting, else he would send them all flying into air if he was not – referring of 
course to the dynamite trucks in the vicinity. On the previous day, he had also seen trucks 
being shunted against other tucks and this motivated his words of caution.
84
 The foreman 
could not determine how fast the train was traveling, but he did say that the force was enough 
to overturn the trucks during the collision. He did not specify which trucks were overturned, 
and it is also important to mention that no one else testified to seeing any trucks being 
overturned during the collision.
85
 Another question that can be asked is how a train going at 
only two miles an hour (as the crew said) could be able to push over another train or cause it 
to fall over. A possibility is that one of the set of trucks simply derailed and then overturned 
or fell over during the collision. The slope of the track should also be taken into 
consideration, as it would have added an extra bit of force at an angle as well as the weight of 
the trucks.
86
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The exact events following the collision are unclear. The testimonies given by those on the 
train vary, sometimes within a testimony given by the same person. What is known is that the 
explosion followed the collision – whether immediately, a few seconds later or after a few 
minutes is what is uncertain. The shunting crew stated that they could not swear that they had 
hit the dynamite trucks. They all said that they did, but that they could not swear to it without 
some kind of doubt.
87
 This could have been born out of a fear that they would surely be 
blamed for the disaster and by telling the truth in this way, they could divert a bit away from 
themselves – because maybe there was another reason for the explosion, and their being on 
the wrong siding was just a coincidence.  
 
Pienaar, the stoker, recounted that while he was turning on the brake, the explosion took 
place and that he did not feel any shock but that he did hear the explosion.
88
 Pienaar like the 
rest was probably knocked unconscious by the explosion and could have likely suffered from 
memory loss and the psychological effects of having gone through such an ordeal. Vermeulen 
recalls Bloom shouting stop, the stoker applying the brake, and then directly feeling the blast, 
after which he was knocked out. He however did not hear the collision of the trucks, and 
could not even say whether he knew if the trucks were still moving or had come to a stop 
when the explosion took place.
89
 Oxer too, said that he did not feel any collision, however his 
timing of the explosion varies from the others. He first said that the explosion occurred one 
minute after the collision, which he did not feel, and later describes it as one and a half 
minutes after the brake was applied.
90
 Bloom, in the same breathe, said that the explosion 
followed the collision, and then immediately afterwards said that the explosion was before 
the shock, before contact was made with the trucks.
91
 What he could have meant is that the 
explosion followed so instantaneously that there was no time for a reaction to the crash itself, 
or that the explosion did occurred before the collision.  
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The fact that these witnesses were not sure that there was a collision before the explosion, 
does not remove the belief here that the explosion did follow the collision. It would be a 
major coincidence yes, if the explosion occurred just before the collision but one cannot 
follow coincidences until there is enough evidence that can support it. The crew, whose 
testimonies are perhaps the most crucial in this thesis, cannot be fully trusted with regard to 
the exact moment the explosion occurred. The reason being that the event itself would have 
caused too much of an impact, on both their physical and mental functioning – they would 
have been injured and knocked unconscious, thus clouding their exact memory. Adding to 
this unreliability is the fact that those who were on the locomotive were 31 trucks away from 
the epicentre of the explosion, and they were around a bend with wood and a shed in between 
them and that area. Williams, who was closer to the front of the train, fell off just as the trains 
collided and was also knocked unconscious by the explosion or the fall, thus not even he 
could give specifics about that moment other than it was possible because of the distance of 
the dynamite trucks from the switch crossing. The man, who was said to be cleaning the 
switch before the explosion, was later instructed by Williams to be on the first truck during 
the shunting as an additional lookout, but was not seen again, and was probably instantly 
killed by the blast.
92
 It should also be noted that around this time Clemm from the Order 
Service and his workmen were busy unloading the dynamite from the trucks, and would have 
also been killed instantly by the explosion.  
 
What is clear is, that the switch was incorrectly set, and the crew again could not say how this 
might have happened. Williams and Vermeulen both claimed that it was in order when they 
inspected it, Oxer stated that he instructed Williams to check the switch, and Bloom and 
Pienaar would have had little to do with it on this day. Oxer, Bloom and Williams all 
mentioned the labourer that was cleaning the switch around half an hour before the explosion. 
They do not specifically say it, but it is implied by them, that this man may have changed the 
setting of the switch while he was cleaning it. However, none of them could say any more 
than conjecture – that it was possible that someone either by accident or through ill will could 
have tampered with the switch.
93
 A question to be considered is, why was Williams not on 
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the front of the train as he was instructed by Oxer – he did put someone else in front, the 
labourer, but why? Furthermore, Oxer was adamant that from where Williams gave the signal 
to cross over the switch, he would have been able to see the switch very clearly and seen that 
it was not in the right position.
94
  
 
What is confirmed here, is that the contact between the shunted trucks and the dynamite 
trucks was an accident, the dynamite trucks were not going to be moved as they were being 
unloaded and the dynamite destined to be delivered. The next chapter discusses the effects of 
the explosion as well the responses to it.  
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Chapter 3: “Mijn Huis is Plat”1 
“Nauseous Pit of Death”2 
At roughly 3:15 p.m., a loud thundering explosion was heard throughout the Witwatersrand 
and further away.
3
 The ten trucks containing 2214 cases of blasting gelatine of 50 lbs. each 
had exploded following the collision with the shunted trucks.
4
 There was an instantaneous 
mass of fire and then a powerful shockwave that pushed through and aside everything in its 
path. A large mushroom cloud stretched up hundreds of feet into the air and was visible from 
miles away (see Appendix 3 for images of the mushroom cloud). The force of the explosion 
ripped a massive tear in the ground where the dynamite trucks were standing, sending dust, 
earth and shrapnel flying in all directions (see Appendix 4).
5
 The exact size of the crater was 
unknown, but one source initially put it at 100 yards in length, 40 yards in width and about 40 
feet deep and another at 200 feet long, 50 feet wide and 25 feet deep.
6
 At the edge of the 
crater, the train tracks curled up into the air, skew and burnt. The explosion destroyed 
practically every house within a quarter mile area, with as much as half of Fordsburg 
destroyed and almost all of Vrededorp.
7
  
 
The Indian location was completely destroyed, along with extensive damage to the other 
locations.  Many of the destroyed homes and dwellings, were made of wood and corrugated 
iron, and caught fire with concealed people or animals still trapped underneath or within 
them. The shockwave shattered nearly every window in reach and further away towards the 
heart of Johannesburg, in Commissioner-street, Pritchard-street and other chief streets, 
windows had been shattered.
8
 Later the damage in these central parts was found to be greater 
than initially thought, with not only shattered windows, but damage to large window frames 
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and masonry statues.
9
 Windows and doors were later boarded up and resembled a town under 
siege. The groans of the injured could be heard throughout the devastation and the amount of 
able bodies was not enough to assist everyone at once. Most of the victims were women, 
children and the elderly, as the explosion took place in the afternoon, while most of the men 
were still at work.
10
 
 
Kerstina Small, a resident of Braamfontein, experienced the explosion first hand. She 
witnessed the blast from about 200 yards away, while talking to a neighbour, and noted that it 
was the trucks that had been there for three days, that had had the collision, but she was 
unaware that those trucks contained explosives. The collision was followed by one very loud 
boom and a large column of fire, after which Small was rendered unconscious. Small did not 
recall seeing a locomotive, but she did remember hearing its whistle. Her entire house was 
flattened by the effects of the explosion.
11
 A similar case was that of Christina Nel, another 
resident of Braamfontein, who was only a few feet behind her house, when the accident took 
place. She heard the trucks crash and then saw the explosion and the large column of fire, and 
was subsequently knocked out. Her house too, was completely destroyed. These cases are 
two of the many that occurred on the 19
th
, with many of the victims being women who were 
alone at home at the time.
12
 This is not to say that there were no men present during the 
explosion. Harry Fell, a man of 40 years old, was also a victim and witness to these events. 
His evidence was almost identical to that of Small and Nel, but he added that the shunting 
train was moving a little faster than usual before the accident, which is odd because the train 
was said to be going slower than usual because of the downward slope.
13
 Another man, 
Adriaan Buitendag, was out selling bread, when the explosion occurred. He was only 160 
steps from the scene of the crash and could add little else to the account. He did say that it 
was too dark to see any locomotive, however he could be referring to after the explosion 
when the smoke around the township began to rise and clouded the area.  
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Annie Theron, a resident of Fordsburg, lost more than just her house, when the blast 
occurred, her young child had been killed as well.
14
 The only record of a child killed with the 
surname Theron, was an 8-month-old boy identified as D.I., although the list specified him as 
being from the Cape Colony.
15
 Many Afrikaners had made their way from the Cape to find 
work on the Rand, and this could have been one of those cases. It can thus be assumed that a 
person living in the Transvaal would still be identified by their region or country of origin, 
even those who were possibly born in the Transvaal and even those who were of Dutch 
decent. Many more children were among the victims of the explosion, and those who 
survived thought that hell had descended upon them.  
 
Tom Adlam was walking home from school when he felt the ground shake beneath him and a 
massive dark cloud of smoke shot up in the distance. There was frighteningly loud thundering 
sound as the dark cloud grew taller and billowed out. The child could not move for a few 
seconds out of fear, while thinking that this was surely the end of the world. Eventually Tom 
started to run home, which was in the direction of the great shadowy cloud. Fortunately, 
when he arrived home, he found his mother and his brothers were unharmed, but in a state of 
distress. His house was full of dust clouds and glass from the western window frame. There 
was a large hole in the wall where the window frame used to be, the other windows had 
simply shattered, and pieces of bricks and mortar covered the floor. Later the family found 
out that an explosion had occurred at the railway yard, almost two miles away from their 
house. A few days later they would visit the scenes of the explosion and the damage done to 
the township.
16
  
 
An indulgently depicted account, describes a young boy, named Jacky Hammond, who was 
digging a ditch, in an attempt to emulate his miner father. He struck his spade into the ground 
a final time when it began to rumble and shudder, followed by a loud roar in the air. The little 
boy jumped up, filled both with fear and excitement to tell his mother that he had dug up hell 
itself.
17
 Another child named Jack, identified as a young coloured boy from Bloemfontein, 
was visiting his mother on the Rand. He was much closer to the explosion than the other two 
boys, and yet survived.  Jack was on the bread seller‟s wagon, as he did deliveries. He was 
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holding the reigns of the horses, in front of an Indian shop when the trucks crashed, after 
which he was thrown backwards by the force of the explosion.
18
 Miles away at a Marist 
Brothers School, the intrigue of mathematics and science became overshadowed by the 
excitement and fearful wonderment of the explosion and its cloud of smoke. The learners 
who were in class had been covered by glass as their windows shattered, but this did not dull 
their ability to storm out of the classroom for a better view of what was happening. Their 
observation was however short lived as they were mustered into the school‟s chapel – partly 
for safety and mostly for prayer.
19
 A small boy, who was again closer to the action, 
remembered lying in his bed when he heard the collision after which he was „asleep‟ – 
knocked unconscious. He did not even hear the explosion. When he woke up he was pinned 
to the bed by iron sheeting and bricks. After a struggle, he managed to free himself, and then 
attempted to do the same for his mother and father who he found to be badly injured.
20
  
 
Not all the children on the Rand were as fortunate as the aforementioned. Six girls were 
playing outside a house when the force of the explosion hit, killing them instantly. It was said 
that their bodies were lying in a circle when they were found, as they probably played a game 
of some kind. There were similar cases of people being instantly killed, who were in the open 
and came into the direct force of the blast. In a different incident, five boys who were bathing 
in a pond drowned as a result of the explosion.
21
 A Sanitary-Inspector, with some workmen 
would later search all the wells in the vicinity, as there were reports that some bodies had 
been blown into them, however no remains were found.
22
 A man, who had been looking for 
his friend at one of the makeshift infirmaries, came across a young boy, of perhaps eight 
years old, who appeared to be sleeping. At a closer inspection the man saw that the boy had a 
triangular hole near one of his temples, where a piece of iron had pierced his head and gone 
into his brain. The boy was probably killed instantly and the man never found his friend. 
There were many dead children at the hospitals, and several were unidentified and unclaimed 
by any parents.
23
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William Langley the magazine caretaker for Lippert, was logically an eye witness to these 
events. He was around the dynamite magazines (Auckland Park), assisting with unloading of 
the dynamite that was finally being delivered, when the explosion took place. The assistant 
caretaker, Alexander Powell was with Langley and both had their backs turned towards the 
direction from which the blast would come. Yet Langley saw the massive flash of fire and 
then found he was lying on the ground. Powell, who was then eight yards from him, had also 
begun to recover and started to move away. The doors of the magazine had been blown open, 
while two pieces of iron had penetrated the roof and made their way to the front of the 
building, fortunately they had not ignited the rest of the dynamite housed there. Afterwards, 
while Langley was attempting to secure the doors, he saw one of the Order Service wagons 
approaching in the distance.
24
  
 
The driver of the wagon was Thomas Bennett who told him that he was at the cemetery 
during the explosion – the cemetery was a few hundred yards away from the railway yard. 
They unloaded this wagon and when they had finished they saw another wagon approaching 
them from the debris. The driver was Swarts, who was only 100 yards from the explosion and 
somehow survived and made it all the way to the magazines. For some reason Bennett and 
Swarts continued their responsibilities after the explosion took place. It is unsure why they 
did this, but one reason could be that they simply wanted to get the dynamite as far away 
from the scene as possible, to prevent a further explosion.
25
   
    
It can be seen, that there was a lot of activity around the railway yard before the explosion, 
with many people going about their business or simply meandering around carelessly. The 
market side of town lay quiet as stores closed earlier on Wednesday afternoons, only those 
with more menial or industrial jobs and professions were still at work.
26
 This refers to the 
mines, the timber mill, the dynamite magazines, and the railway yard and order service. 
People towards the centre of the city had different experiences, and found themselves in a 
world resembling an earthquake rather than that of a fiery hurricane. One man of about 25 
years was standing and talking with a friend in Kerk Street, when the buildings around them 
started to shudder and shake, and the windows shattered into pieces. People ran out into the 
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streets to find out what had happened. The young man ran to the corner of Kerk and Harrison 
Street towards Braamfontein, where he saw the enormous smoke cloud rising.
27
 Store owners 
ran into the street without locking their doors, everyone was overcome by a great desire to 
know what happened. Several people said that Judge de Korte, who was hearing a case that 
afternoon, ran out the courtroom into the street, still wearing his robes to find out what was 
going on.
28
 A cyclist, and in fact member of the Sanitary Board, was on his way to a meeting 
when suddenly found himself lying in the street with a dislocated arm.
29
 A wedding service 
was underway on the Afternoon of February 19, in the old synagogue, and was near its end 
when the blast hit the filled building. No one was injured, but the congregation was well 
shaken and made a rush for the door.
30
 Churches, whose walls were strong enough to 
withstand the force of the explosion, instead had their roofs blown off.
31
 Two Germans 
narrowly escaped the explosion, while they were working at the pumping station, about 100 
yards away from the centre of the blast. One was blown twenty yards away and received a 
few injuries, while the other was stripped of all his clothes while sustaining a severe shock 
and temporary hearing loss.
32
  
 
At first, the basic causes of the explosion were not known to the public or even officials, and 
many speculated, including newspapers. One report was that two trucks, both containing 
dynamite, collided, another said that the dynamite magazines at Auckland Park had exploded. 
There was even a question concerning a possible earthquake.
33
 There were also reports for 
some time that one of the tanks in the gas works had erupted and caused the explosion. This 
was of course not the case, but the tanks themselves were affected by the blast, with the main 
tank becoming quite unstable, before being brought under control once more.
34
 Intelligence 
given to Pretoria also described that two dynamite wagons had collided, causing a serious 
explosion with the loss of life in the hundreds.
35
 Another source said that a locomotive was 
being moved in to be attached to the trucks, and due to the heat of the past three days, this 
contact was enough to set off the dynamite. The possibility that the boiler of the locomotive 
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had burst and led to the blast was also initially considered. However later it was established 
by eye witnesses that it had been a shunting accident, where the trucks that were being 
pushed, „bumped violently‟ into the dynamite trucks.36  
 
The exact numbers of those killed or injured were difficult to fathom on the first few days, 
with estimations going into the hundreds. Newspapers reported that around 200 were killed 
with about 300 injured. Corpses and bits of remains were scattered throughout the scene; the 
carcasses and pieces of mule and horse were also amongst the human remains making matters 
of recovery and calculation more difficult. Pieces of human remains were initially collected 
in bags for when they could be identified or buried. The scenes would surely have been 
gruesome and indescribable for the stunned citizens of the city, who would not have been 
accustomed to any of this. It would have been even more distressing for those arriving home 
from the mines or other occupations, to find their homes in ruin and fire. One journalist came 
across a portion of a face that resembled a mask but it was so badly disfigured that he could 
not even make out what the race of the man or woman was.
37
 An eyewitness is said to have 
seen a set of mules, still attached to their wagon flying through the air by the force of the 
blast.
38
 Another witness saw a torn hand with a beautiful diamond ring on the finger.
39
  
 
Elsewhere a man was nursing his wounded child in his arms, within the ruin of their home. 
The father, himself injured and distraught with grief, refused to be separated from his child 
who needed medical treatment, and eventually did receive it.  In another house an entire 
family lay dead – a father, a mother and their three children.40 In a different scene a dog 
waited among the ruin and scattered belongings of its dead mistress, waiting for her to return 
(see Appendix 7).
41
 In an odd occurrence also involving an animal, it was reported in an 
American newspaper that a large monkey, which survived the explosion, had arrived there by 
ship a few months later. It was in the company of a passenger who had found it, in one of the 
partially destroyed houses, along with two toddlers, one of whom was dead. It was said that 
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the monkey who was very fond of children was nursing the surviving toddler in its arms. 
Needless to say, the animal caused a great sensation aboard the ship.
42
 
 
Among the fatalities and serious injuries, there were also a lot of „close calls‟, where victims 
had merely been blown over, suffering only from a head ache to a mild concussion.
43
 Aside 
from this, people were also found alive beneath the rubble – a day after the explosion, a two 
year old was found alive and virtual unharmed beneath the ruins.
44
 Similarly a man was 
discovered five days after the disaster, amongst the debris, who had subsequently been 
knocked out, and had only sustained a broken rib.
45
 Beside the humans, both alive and dead, 
and the animal remains around the scene of the explosion, were pieces of iron and wood, 
bedframes, pianos and other various items scattered around – just some of the basic and even 
more extravagant household items that were ripped out of homes.
46
 At the temporary 
mortuaries and hospitals, dozens had to identify the remains of family members, with often 
the last remaining member being the one to do so.  
 
This section has attempted to show the scope of the immediate effects of the explosion, from 
different perspectives and literal vantage points. However, it would be impossible to 
completely recreate the experiences of the explosion, but one can still try to understand them.   
 
 
Aftercare: Hospitals, Relief and Compensation 
The initial reaction of the people of Johannesburg was to assist the injured and collect the 
dead as promptly as they could – L. J. Carr notes this as being a spontaneous feature of all 
disasters, that occurs without any organisation but that will be “gradually taken over by 
institutionalised agencies such as firemen, policemen, soldiers, Red Cross workers and the 
like,” as time moves on.47 He further states that:  
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“For aiding the injured, feeding and sheltering the homeless, and for 
protecting property from fire and theft, every community either has 
institutionalised agencies at hand or is speedily given the benefit of those in 
nearby communities. But for dealing with the disorganisation of community 
services caused by disaster no community has any plan or prearranged 
organisation.”48  
 
When President Kruger first heard about the explosion, it was said that he was furious, and 
directed his anger at the management of the Railway Company – who he vowed would pay – 
his anger would subsequently be replaced by a solemn state.
49
 The following day (Thursday, 
20 February 1896) he arrived by special train from Pretoria, with a small entourage of state 
officials, including the acting State Secretary, as W. J. Leyds was in London on diplomatic 
business. The President sent instructions that there be no extravagant welcome for him at 
Park Station, and this was so. Yet there were over a thousand people to greet to him, in quiet 
anticipation. He was taken directly to the scene of the explosion, where the details that were 
known at that point, were explained to him. Afterwards he paid a visit to the Wanderers 
Sports Grounds “hospital”, where he gradually passed each bed, and offered a few words or a 
prayer (see Appendix 5). It was said the presence of the dead and wounded children brought 
the President to tears. Kruger later thanked the entire city of Johannesburg for their 
fellowship in assisting one another during the crisis and care giving. Theatres and music halls 
were closed and all comparable entertainment was cancelled in respect of the victims and the 
disaster at hand.
50
   
 
Throughout the evening of Wednesday the 19
th
, cabs and wagons commuted to and from the 
Wanderers, where the hall had been set up as a makeshift hospital and mortuary. They 
brought the dead, the dying and the injured. This was boosted by the aid of the local St. 
John‟s Ambulance Association who had all the necessary supplies, such as stretchers and 
bandages, needed for on scene first aid.
51
 Cabs were eventually stopped, as they were 
carrying the dead along with the living to the hospitals and the two had to be distinguished as 
things moved on – often remains were brought in which were near impossible to tell whether 
they were human or animal.
52
 At one point it was reported that the Relief Committee 
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ultimately paid over £300 for cab hire, for various tasks, such as the moving of the dead and 
injured. The usual rate per day was £2,12s however the cab owners charged £3 per day under 
the circumstances.
53
 The final report of the Relief Fund would eventually put the total of cab 
and cart hire at £1403.
54
  
 
The numbers at the hospitals reached the hundreds, with most of the victims there being 
identified as „poor whites‟, with the majority being children. Many of the patients had to be 
placed on the floor as available space was quickly filled.
55
 Police and ordinary citizen 
searched through the rubble, excavating the living or dead – many of the policemen were 
themselves injured, but many still fulfilled their duties.
56
 One policeman, who had carried out 
his duties until his shift was over, had rushed home only to find his entire house destroyed 
along with his wife and two children.
57
 Another policeman with a bad head wound, was seen 
carrying a child into one of the hospitals – one of the seven he had brought there on a 
wagon.
58
 A constable who was 100 yards away from the explosion was blown over, suffering 
only from a mild headache afterwards.
59
 Hundreds of volunteers formed into search parties 
and spread out among the debris to locate and rescue any survivors – all around were men in 
hats and suits, alongside the debris, with the occasional horse drawn cart riding through or 
stopping to assist (see Appendix 6).
60
 Even businesses closed their doors so that they could 
assist in the search and rescue.
61
  
 
Patients were treated at the Johannesburg hospital, the Wanderers and the Crown Reef 
works.
62
 The Wanderers was probably used for its space and its close proximity to the real 
hospital, which was only a few streets away.
63
 All available doctors, nurses and volunteers 
had their hands full at these medical centres, with the constant arrivals and lack of immediate 
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space, yet the medical staff was praised for their efforts.
64
 The staff numbered twelve doctors, 
along with sixteen trained nurses and many volunteer nurse and other assistants.
65
 Local 
women tore up their dresses to make bandages and offered their assistance as nurses to the 
overworked doctors and nurses. In the Cape, additional nurses were recruited by Professor 
Liebmahn, who returned there from Krugersdorp, and called for any capable nurses to join 
his staff – any nurse who wished to help was to contact him at Rondebosch.66 
 
About a hundred of the slightly wounded victims were discharged on the same day, following 
minor treatment, which appreciatively made room for the injured still arriving. The more 
serious cases would remain, with many only receiving superior medical treatment and 
examinations the next day. The noise made by the patients in pain and bewilderment was said 
to be quite distressing with variations based on day or night. Eventually a rule had to be 
established to maintained quiet, with patients having to bare their pain in silence. Most 
patients were said to have endured their pain with fortitude with others conveying a cheerful 
front.
67
 Amputations were commonplace at all the hospitals, as well as the restoration of 
trepanning, due to the nature of the injuries sustained during the blast, while several deaths 
occurred during the night.
68
  Most injuries treated were sustained to the head, with multiple 
being fractured skulls and broken limbs.
69
 Doctors reported that most of the severe injuries 
had been caused by flying metal and wood, and that the severity of the wounds had initially 
startled them.
70
 To the advantage of the medical staff, the Medical Committee had been given 
full authority to order anything they needed and to even beseech for more if needed.
71
  At the 
official hospital both black wards were cleared for victims of the explosion. The patients who 
were in these wards were moved to tents on the grounds, and those with more serious cases 
were placed in wards for whites.
72
 It was reported, that very little discrimination was 
displayed in the efforts to assist the injured however this could merely be exaggerated.
73
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The first of several funerals took place the day after the explosion, where 50 bodies were 
buried, along with 20 coffins containing indiscriminate body parts and fragments. Large 
crowds attended the service, which was said to be quite impressive, complete with a full brass 
band. Mourners who had not been able to identify their relatives, gathered around the 20 
coffins of mixed remains, and openly expressed their grief.
74
 On the 22
nd
 another funeral took 
place where 27 victims were buried, and this was again largely attended.
75
 The Cemetery 
itself was only a few metres away from the site of the explosion.  
 
On the night of the 20
th
, a meeting was held in the Stock Exchange to plan and organise relief 
for all the sufferers of the explosion. Out of this meeting came the Relief Committee, 
presided over by Mr Hancock of the Sanitary Board. A Distribution Committee was also 
initiated and was active during most of this time. Food, clothing and all essentials were 
already supplied and more were being prepared – clothing was even assembled in Cape 
Town. The public was afforded the chance to add the names of men they wished to join the 
Committee, and a large number were proposed, including two members of the Volksraad.
76
    
When the relief fund was established on the evening of the explosion, contributions began 
streaming in almost immediately, before the relief committee was even formed. It was 
decided that one relief fund would function better under the control of committee.
77
 President 
Kruger himself was asked to be the president of the Relief Fund which he accepted.
78
  
 
There were many channels through which subscriptions for the main Relief Fund were 
collected. The Reuter‟s Agency in Johannesburg opened a subscription list for which the 
funds were to be used to set up temporary housing for the hundreds homeless, and 
subscriptions from the Cape were made possible through the Reuter‟s Agency in Cape 
Town.
79
 The news of the event was not even a few hours old yet when the fund reached £40 
000, and by the night of the 19
th
 the subscription lists at the Stock Exchange, Eckstein & Co. 
and Mr Langerman‟s, surpassed £50 000. Another list was started by the Chamber of 
Commerce with the President of the Chamber heading the list with a sum of ten guineas. The 
Argus Printing and Publishing Company subscribed £200 to the main fund, and an additional 
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fund was started by the Advertiser‟s office in Kimberley.80 By the 20th, the general relief fund 
was at £60 000, with donations from E. Lippert and the Dynamite Company, each at £5000.
81
 
During initial valuations of damages, it was believed that losses for the poorer of the victims 
amounted to £270 000. Damage to machinery, windows and building was assessed to be over 
£50 000. Damages to property in and around Fordsburg alone were estimated to be around 
£60, 000.
82
 At the end of it all, combined damages of everything attributed to the explosion, 
were estimated to be around £1 000 000.
83
 When the general manager of African United 
Insurance Corporation heard about the large loss to property, he ordered that all losses caused 
by the explosion be paid out. A call was also made for all available mechanics to offer their 
services, as officials wished to have the process of reconstruction underway promptly. It was 
reported that the township was likely to take on a more modern look, and that the new 
cottages would reflect the style of the artisan classes.
84
 These plans were most likely to be 
directed at Fordsburg and Braamfontein, which contain the white working classes, while the 
other racial groups in Vrededorp and the other locations were probably not considered in 
these plans.  
 
As early as 21 February, the Relief Fund had risen to £66 000 and arrangements were being 
made by the Relief Committee to further aid the sufferers – tents were erected as well as 
other requirements necessary for the victims were organised, such as clothing and food. By 
the 25
th
, one hundred tents had been set up, with more still being prepared.
85
  Free railway 
passes were made available to sufferers who applied for them, to any station on the 
Netherlands
86
, Cape or Natal railways – 455 were granted and this represented 1373 people.87 
Additionally a committee of seven were appointed to assess the damage done to property and 
possessions, for the purposes of compensation.
88
 In addition to this, a meeting was held by 
the Mercantile Association and the Chamber of Commerce, where it was decided that a Court 
should be appointed to further ascertain damages and loss sustained, to pay attention to the 
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Commission of Inquiry, and to take necessary steps in the interests of merchants and other 
victims of the explosion.
89
 One correspondent spoke to a valuator, a Mr Morkel who was an 
auctioneer from Joubert-street, who also worked as a government appraiser, and had been in 
contact with several of the families who had property damaged. Morkel saw over 100 houses 
in Fordsburg and Braamfontein, with these houses being of a higher quality (brick and 
mortar) than the mostly shanties of the neighbouring locations. The value of the homes 
ranged between £50 to £1500, with the average loss or damage to them being around £400. 
The nature of the damage here consisted of broken roofs, cracked walls and brick linings, and 
in a few cases boarded floors were damaged. As he did not visit or evaluate the shanties, he 
estimated their value was well below £1500 and that even the “most elaborate” would cost 
around £100.
90
 
 
A further inquiry was carried out on the 28
th
, when two justices of the peace sat at Fordsburg 
to hear declarations from those who had lost property.
91
 There was also a report presented by 
property valuators, who assessed the damages to the houses examined by them, to be over 
£50 000.
92
 It was also specified that the Railway Company would rebuild churches and would 
not dispute any reasonable claims.
93
 The company correspondingly subscribed £10 000.
94
 On 
the other hand it took the Dynamite Company until July 17 to finally confirm that it would 
assist with the compensation efforts.
95
 A large gathering of property owners assembled before 
the hearing took place, illustrating the importance of the hearing and the psychological value 
of property.
96
 It can be understood that property was important to those who lost it, as many 
were part of the newly formed Afrikaner working class, who ventured out to the Rand in 
search of financial opportunities. Most came from an agricultural background, where one‟s 
land was one‟s livelihood.97 It had been reported that 400 tents had been erected for the 
homeless and most of the patients at the Wanderers had been moved to hospitals.
98
 The Relief 
Committee either purchased or borrowed tents, these numbered 278, and were put under the 
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supervision of a Tent Inspector. Later the tents were sold and the funds were added to that of 
the Relief Fund.
99
 
 
Those who were left homeless were estimated to be between 2000 and 3000. The buildings 
on the showgrounds of the Agricultural Society housed several hundred of the destitute, on 
the night of the explosion and more by 20 February, and these numbers increased. Children 
were originally sheltered at the Baptist Church and the Nazareth Home.
100
 Victims at the 
showgrounds numbered over 600, and were mostly whites, while arrangements and 
provisions were all well organised, and shelter had been prepared for 1000 people.
101
 Earlier 
figures showed that 163 whites were being housed in the stables; 64 whites in the 
refreshment-room no. 1; and 200 whites and 115 coloureds in the refreshment-room no. 2 – 
this totalled 542 people, a number that increased significantly.
102
 There may have been room 
for the victims, but there was still great need for mattresses, blankets and clothing.
103
 
Requests were also made for clothing and toys for all the children affected.
104
  
 
The show grounds became a small village resembling a commune, where people received 
shelter, food and clothing (see Appendix 8). The Relief Fund identified two categories of 
residents at this „village‟: “those who received rations and cooked for themselves,” and 
“those who were fed in the large dining-room.”105 Additional sufferers who found shelter 
with friends, received rations from the relief centre set up in Fordsburg at Kelly‟s Home. The 
scale of all the rations was based on the allowance of British soldiers, with an extra half 
pound of meat per day. After some time a hospital was set up at the show grounds, and 
patients from the medical centres were moved here, where they were monitored by a resident 
surgeon and trained nurses. An investigative team examined all the cases of those who 
received relief, and once an able bodied man could again support his family, his name would 
be struck off the list of those requiring relief.
106
 This probably also meant that families whose 
bread winner had not been injured at all, would have not received relief for very long.   
 
                                                 
99
 TAB – SS – R13782/96, Dynamite Relief Fund, p. 65. 
100
 The Cape Argus, 21 February 1896, “The Rand Calamity,” p. 5. 
101
 The Cape Times, 24 February 1896, “Rand Catastrophe,” p. 5. 
102
 The Cape Times, 22 February 1896, “The Rand Catastrophe,” p. 5. 
103
 The Cape Times, 22 February 1896, “The Rand Catastrophe,” p. 5. 
104
 The Cape Times, 24 February 1896, “Rand Catastrophe,” p. 5. 
105
 TAB – SS – R13782/96, Dynamite Relief Fund, p. 65. 
106
 Ibid. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
47 
 
Remains were still being found by 28 February and promptly taken to the cemetery, the 
clearing of debris was also continuing. By the 29
th
 of February, the grand total of the Relief 
Fund was at £123 167, with more subscriptions still coming in. On the same day in 
Klerksdorp, a gathering was held to organise a relief fund there in aid of the Johannesburg 
Relief Fund. Here another committee was appointed to canvass the town for donations.
107
 
President Kruger personally donated £200, while the subscription list entered the hands of the 
Executive Council, who were to distribute it to all government departments by the 1
st
 of 
March.
108
 The official report of the Relief Fund, put the final amount of subscriptions at 
£125 935.1s, with an interest of £464.2s, making the total accumulation £126 399.3s.
109
  
 
It becomes apparent in this section, that there were many channels for both the provision of 
contributing aid, and the assessment of damages for loss, compensation or restoration. There 
were constant exchanges of opinions, often critical among the public and officials. There was 
no lack of agency in this regard, and even though the disaster was unexpected, the reaction of 
the town was swift and its apparatus functioned effectively, although at times under pressure. 
Referring to natural disasters, Schenk states that because of the economic and political 
consequences of such events, people are compelled to act resulting in a mobilised 
administration and general public.
110
 Even though the Braamfontein Explosion was not a 
natural disaster, these were certainly the circumstances that followed.  
 
 
The Public and Their Opinions 
It will always be difficult to illuminate the feelings and opinions of people that lived over a 
hundred years ago. Even eye witnesses who document or have their experiences documented 
tend to forget, or add things to their own account as time moves on. One witness to the 
Braamfontein Explosion, wrote of his experiences in 1948, 52 years after the event, and 
compared it to descriptions he had heard of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima (1945).
111
 
Needless to say this will never be an accurate account of the events of the explosion, nor 
would it conjure up the same public responses or opinions. There are different descriptions of 
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the people that occupied the spaces of the worst hit areas. It is understood, that the Afrikaner 
working class occupied the suburbs of Fordsburg and Vrededorp. The latter had been 
specifically assigned in 1893 by the Transvaal, for impoverished Afrikaners who had lost 
their livelihood in the countryside. Most of the Afrikaners who lived in these suburbs were 
transport riders, cab drivers or brickmakers, yet these suburbs would remain in poverty.
112
  
 
Prior to 1895, there was a reactively small amount of unemployed Afrikaners on the Rand.
113
 
The Dutch built railways that appeared in the mid-1890s, would play a considerable part in 
the eventual unemployment of many of the men who live in Vrededorp and Fordsburg, but 
before that, the railway was involved in the death of their wives and children and the 
destruction of their homes.
114
 Early Johannesburg, however, did not have an abundance of 
working class families, and the town itself was dominated by men, many of who were unsure 
in the stability and future of life on the Rand. These men were mostly immigrant miners who 
would have had to stretch their finances to bring their wives and children to the Rand.
115
 With 
the many injuries and deaths of women and children caused by the explosion, linked with 
their Afrikaans surnames, it is clear that a large contingent of Afrikaner men had families on 
the Rand (see Appendixes 9 and 10 for list of dead and injured). Thus the majority of these 
families would have lived in Vrededorp and Fordsburg with some in Braamfontein, and were 
in fact quite large – one family consisted of eight members, a husband, wife and six 
children.
116
 
 
In relation to the explosion, Fordsburg lay to the south and south-east of the epicentre, while 
Braamfontein lay to the east with a fraction north. In between Fordsburg and the railway were 
two smaller African and Indian location – to the east of these three were the Brickfields, also 
known as Burgersdorp.
117
 The Brickfields was home to another group of poor Afrikaners who 
had left their rural lifestyle to start over on the Rand – in late 1887 they petitioned 
government to allow them to make bricks from the clay deposits, and by the 1890s the 
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Brickfields had become an enduring feature and an economic haven for the poor Afrikaner.
118
 
To the south-west was Mayfair. In the direct north-west of where the explosion occurred was 
the large township known as the “Native Location”, which was made up of Vrededorp, the 
Indian location, the African location and the Malay location. As was mentioned earlier, 
Fordsburg and the “Native Location” experienced the full brunt of the explosion, because the 
railway siding was positioned directly in between these two townships or suburbs.
119
 
Therefore the people or social groups that were most affected by the disaster were Africans, 
Afrikaners, Cape Malays, and Indians. The other occupants of the locations would have been 
employed in various roles throughout the Rand. Coloured Muslims, also called Malays, had 
briefly prospered in the early days as cabbies, before their role eventually declined due to the 
industrialisation of transport.
120
 Africans would have occupied roles as miners, washermen 
and „houseboy‟.121 Again it has to be said that it is unthinkable that an explosives siding was 
kept in the middle of residential areas, however this can be accounted to then nature of the 
development of Johannesburg. Thus where the railway line might have been on the edge of 
the town, it would end up running through the middle as the town simply overlapped it.  
 
There had been many complaints to the Railway Company about the exposed dynamite in the 
vicinity of the houses and of the further dangers of the delays in offloading.
122
 The same 
question had been asked of the local authorities, and not too long before the explosion the 
public had petitioned government as well. All these requests were ignored.
123
 A survivor of 
the explosion, said that he had complained about the presence of dynamite, to the Railway 
Company on the Sunday (16 February 1896) when the explosives had arrived, but that he 
received a discourteous response.
124
 Following the explosion there were two opinions that 
were quite damning for the Railway Company. Firstly, the initial blame was being placed 
solely at its doorstep, with its officials receiving harsh criticism – being described as “novices 
in railway work” and their conduct being “normally silly and grotesque”.125 Arthur 
Rutherford, chief magazine caretaker and Lippert‟s right hand man, placed the blame firmly 
on the Railway Company‟s shunting operation, and denied any responsibility his office might 
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have had in the delay.
126
 Secondly, the Railway Company‟s response to the disaster was 
criticised, or rather their lack of response. A rumour was circulating, that the employees of 
the company, from the top to the bottom, had displayed an indecisiveness following the 
disaster and a disregard for the suffering of the victims – saying that they looked on with their 
hands their pockets while others were labouring to help the victims. This was fervently 
denied by an official of the company, who said that he was grieved by the allegations and that 
most of his employees were the first on the scene. He on went to explain that of many the 
employees were themselves injured or dead and several had volunteered to assist at the 
Wanderers.
127
 A correspondent from The Star newspaper later reported that he had passed the 
railway station about a month before the explosion, and witnessed the disturbing manner in 
which it was being offloaded. He explained that the cases of dynamite were being flung from 
the train onto a wagon like sacks of coal, landing with a loud thump.
128
 The correspondent 
then spoke to the policeman
129
, who was on duty at the crossing, about the circumstances 
involving the unloading, to which he replied: “I can‟t prevent it; it is the way they always 
load the dynamite here.”130    
   
Where there was disenchantment and frustration with the actions of the Railway Company, 
there was clear professional contempt towards the products of the Dynamite Company. Not 
only were consumers angry about the monopoly which forced them to buy dynamite from the 
Company, many were more than displeased with the quality of the dynamite. The opinion of 
the chemist and metallurgist of the Jubilee mine, was that the quality of the explosives was 
vastly inferior, and that the heat of the sun was the deciding factor and not the shunting 
collision. He held that if the dynamite had been left long enough it would have spontaneously 
exploded without any contact. He regularly advocated the appointment of an official 
inspector of explosives, as he felt that because the dynamite was an import there was no 
guarantee as to its quality or safety. He also suggested there be a public laboratory to test 
every item of dynamite that was imported.
131
 The director of the dynamite factory in 
Leeuwfontein admitted that there had been complaints about the dynamite, but only with 
regard to its packaging, that the paper wrapped around the cartridge was too thin and tore 
easily. However 14 days prior to the explosion, there had been no further complaints 
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concerning this matter.
132
 The broader public blamed what they termed „the German 
dynamite‟ and made frequent commentaries about this now publically considered foreign 
product.
133
   
 
Following the disaster, public criticism was similarly directed at the Sanitary Board, for not 
conducting the search of remains themselves, especially since the fear of potential disease 
and pestilence caused by the remains of both humans and animals began to emerge.
134
 The 
conditions were worsened by the fact that the people who were at risk, were exposed to the 
varying temperatures as well as not being sufficiently fed and clothed, making them 
susceptible to illness or worse. The Sanitary Board was criticised for not doing more and for 
not removing all the remains by the Thursday (20 February), as was considered possible.
135
 
Subsequently the Inspector of Mines with a group of prisoners supervised by guards, 
rummaged through the ruins in search of human remains.
136
 The prisoners numbered 130, and 
would come across personal effects of value (on one occasion a gold watch and earring) and 
severed body parts. The remains would be wrapped in linen and sent to the hospital to be 
officially buried later. The prisoners worked well, and were eager to keep going, as they were 
often rewarded with the items they found, such as boots or stockings, which they would wear 
almost immediately. Their labour was from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m. and then from 1:55 p.m. to 4:30 
p.m.
137
  
 
There was further criticism weighed against the Sanitary Board when it was found that their 
chairman had gone on holiday in Natal three days after the explosion, and that the Town 
Engineer had not been recalled by the Board following the catastrophe. The public felt that 
there was a general lack of urgency among the Board.
138
 The Sanitary Board however was 
not completely idle. Following the explosion they sent a telegram to the government to 
request that no more dynamite be allowed within the town, and that a magazine site and 
siding be built 5 miles to the north. This 5 miles idea was probably based on the fact that 
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houses as far as 5 miles sustained damage from the blast.
139
 The Board even sent a special 
constable to monitor the dynamite magazines, to ensure that no explosives were delivered.
140
  
The Sanitary Board was also central in the formation of the Relief Committee and the Relief 
Fund and had initially warned government about the risks of the remains still unrecovered.
141
 
However the public would have probably preferred a more hands on approach. Criticism on 
the Rand would have been surely been a three way streak, with Uitlanders and Uitlander 
businesses especially, forming their own opinions and criticisms; the Burghers of the 
Transvaal having a more pro-government stance; and the officials of the various concessions 
defending themselves and their interests.    
 
It was widely reported and discussed, that the explosion had brought the people of the Rand 
together through their joint aid and relief work. It was further said, that the recent turmoil 
between Dutchman and Englishman was set aside and forgotten during the crisis, and that all 
races were unified.
142
 President Kruger himself in his thanks to the people of the Rand 
mentioned this unity through crisis.
143
 The validity of this would be quite difficult and 
pointless to verify, as it would have been an isolated occurrence, as well as a more 
sentimental view and concept. There were however comments going around that there was a 
lack of Dutch names on the Dynamite Relief Fund subscription lists, and was potentially 
further provoked by the fact that most of the victims were of Dutch ancestry.
144
 
  
Amidst all the apparent unity through chaos and suffering, crime featured as well. A well-
established businessman from the produce firm Shlom & Bloom, went missing on the 
evening of the 21 February, while observing the scenes of the destruction. According to him, 
he was brutally attacked by a couple of men, who stole his watch, chain, other belongings and 
money. He was then thrown into a pit, where one of the search parties found him, and took 
him to hospital.
145
 There were also reports of robberies or attempted robberies taking place 
around the ruined homes. Some of the victims had kept money in private boxes within their 
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homes, and these where subsequently found to be broken open and emptied.
146
 Another illicit 
incident was the impersonation of a medical doctor. At around 3 p.m. on 24 February, a 
Sunday afternoon, a man under the name of Edward Bell was given over to a sergeant of the 
police force, on a charge of “making people believe he was a qualified medical 
practitioner”.147 One man was charged with robbing the dead and was promptly 
imprisoned.
148
 It was also suggested that the public itself had made away with vital evidence 
needed for the ensuing investigation. The site of the explosion was not cordoned off and the 
public moved around this area freely, taking wood, iron and other items that some believed 
could be used as evidence.
149
 These items were possibly used for the reconstructions of 
dwellings or shanties.    
 
When the Commission of Inquiry was announced, there were doubts about the effectiveness 
of it – whether any real outcome or judgement would be established, and that anyone would 
be subsequently punished. This was further based on public criticism of some of the members 
appointed to the commission – particularly J. F. De Beer the Railway Commissioner, of 
which it was discussed that placing someone of his occupation on the Commission of Inquiry 
already defeats the object, especially since his exact relationship with the Railway Company 
was unknown but believed to be very close and confidential. Thus he was well linked to one 
of the parties which were blamed for the explosion. Furthermore, placing a Railway 
Commissioner who apparently knew nothing about railroads, was just adding „insult to 
injury‟.150 Yet the public was satisfied with the appointment of J. Klimke, the State Mining 
Engineer, to sit on the commission, who they felt was a capable man.
151
 What really did add 
insult to injury was that on the day directly after the explosion, a large wagon of dynamite 
was being transported through Braamfontein by only one driver, at such a fast pace that one 
of the cases had begun to fall off, but was stopped and pushed back when the driver saw it.
152
 
On the Saturday three wagons of explosives passed through Braamfontein, the lead wagon‟s 
dynamite was covered with canvas, while the dynamite cases on the other two were exposed 
to the sun. Even more alarming was that on the day before the explosion another wagon 
packed with dynamite, sped through Braamfontein and again under the charge of one man, 
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who this time was seated on top of the shipment smoking his pipe.
153
 After the explosion, 
there were more causes for concern. Firstly, 50 tons of dynamite had been found at the 
Pretoria railway station, and had been there for a few days without any precautions or 
supervision.
154
 Secondly, there was another, albeit smaller explosion on the Rand, this time at 
a Krugersdorp mine, where one miner was killed.
155
 
    
Superstition was also a feature among the Rand working class families, and after the 
explosion many started recalling the omens they saw which implied an impending doom. One 
man whose wife was seriously injured and at hospital, told of how a few days before the 
explosion, three drops of blood fell from the iron roof onto his wife‟s hand as she was 
preparing a meal.
156
 His house was made of iron without any wood lining, and the “very real 
blood” fell directly from the iron sheets. Two day after that, a single drop of „blood‟ fell on 
the man‟s own hand, just behind his knuckles. He was completely positive that the substance 
was blood, and the feeling was shared by his neighbours, who corroborated the story. After 
he and the neighbours had conferred with several more people, they all came to the 
conclusion that it was an omen of evil.
157
 What could possibly have happened, was that due 
to the summer heat of February and the change in temperature during the day, perspiration 
might have built up along the iron sheets of the house. Coupled with the natural rust that 
would have befallen iron exposed to the elements, a drop could have formed over the rust 
absorbing some of its reddish colour, and thus taken on the look of blood. Braamfontein 
Station had also begun looking like an „ill-omened‟ location, as another accident occurred on 
the Saturday (21 February). While some workmen were rebuilding the railway shed, the part 
that was left standing by the blast collapsed injuring two men, and hospitalising one.
158
 
 
The elements of superstition are not always a part of some mystical characteristic of the 
individual, but are also simply one‟s search for answers, to come to terms with the events at 
hand. In the case of the Braamfontein Explosion where few rational answers could be given, 
especially at the early stages, some people simply turned to the supernatural for answers. And 
when these superstitious assumptions were discussed within likeminded groups, they could 
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be supported and reinforced to the point where they could be accepted as fact or truth.
159
 
Likewise, Schenk notes that (natural) disasters have the ability to conjure up exchanges 
between people about the religious interpretations thereof.
160
 Although it cannot be 
established how far the above-mentioned assumptions went, it can be said that the original 
individual fully believed what he had seen and later accepted to be a mystical sign of events 
to come.
161
 
    
In retrospect, 1896 had not been a particularly good year for the people of the Rand. The 
previous year ended with an attempted invasion (Jameson Raid) with the secondary purpose 
of stirring up an Uitlander uprising, and which spilled over into early 1896, during which 
Johannesburg was briefly controlled by the Reform Committee.
162
 The explosion took place 
only a few weeks later. A few days after the blast, there was a great fire in the centre of town, 
around Pritchard Street, with some stores sustaining serious damage, and there was also an 
on-going water crisis.
163
 The summer of 1895-96, was a particularly hot one, with a severe 
drought that caused the water supply from the Waterworks Co. to falter. The water supplier 
attempted to make it rain by firing rockets into the clouds at the Wanderers, this failed and 
was considered sacrilege by the more God-fearing of the public. Water eventually had to be 
bought per bucket.
164
     
 
 
External Responses 
By the 20
th
 and 21
st
 of February, news of the calamity had broken in the Cape Colony, Natal, 
Britain, Australia and America, with rather well informed reports and knowledge about 
events.
165
 There was certainly international interest in the Rand due to the gold industry, and 
it was visible in the wide coverage of the disaster. With the distribution of details pertaining 
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to the explosion and its consequences, the communication of sympathy became common 
place. The Cape Colony and Natal were among the first external territories to share their 
condolences with the Transvaal and President Kruger.
166
 The Mayor of Durban went as far as 
to arrange for the opening of a subscriptions list for the relief of sufferers, which were to be 
left at various stores and banks where the public was invited to contribute for the aid of the 
victims.
167
 The gesture was much appreciated and accepted by the Transvaal, who not only 
sent its thanks, but also the requested particulars of the many homeless.
168
 In other towns 
around the country many were anxious to find out what the fate of their relatives and friends 
were who lived near the scene of the disaster, as they had not heard from them since the news 
broke.
169
     
 
In Cape Town, at the meeting of the Town Council on the morning of the 20
th
, the Mayor of 
the city informed the council that he had sent two telegrams to the Transvaal – one to 
President Kruger and the other the Landdrost of Johannesburg – both expressed the sympathy 
of the city and was met with unanimous approval from the council.
170
 During the council, 
concerns were also expressed of the possibility of a similar disaster happening in Cape Town, 
specifically at the jetty. One member told of how he‟d seen several wagon drivers, with a 
consignment of dynamite stop at canteens for a drink, with their loads unattended.
171
 There 
was a general carelessness when it came to dynamite in South Africa, and many were guilty.        
 
Royal sympathies had also became common for Kruger, and on February 20 he received a 
cable through the High Commissioner from the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, 
conveying the sympathies of Queen Victoria, expressing her regret on the disaster and the 
suffering of the victims and homeless.
172
 Kruger would reply with his appreciation for the 
Queen‟s words and for her support during the difficult time.173 Kaiser Wilhelm II in the same 
way cabled Kruger to offer his deepest sympathy with the sufferers, condoling with him on 
the loss of so many citizens.
174
 The Queen and Queen Regent of the Netherlands telegraphed 
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Kruger with the expressions of their compassion, and contributed £100 to the Relief Fund.
175
 
Remaining with the Netherlands but in a different direction, was the Railway Company, who 
had been in contact with its head offices in Amsterdam, concerning its response to the 
disaster and what the company would do in the way of relief.
176
 Further overseas funds came 
from British individuals
177
 and businesses
178
 through subscriptions opened by London‟s 
Standard and Diggers’ News, the most famous of these being the capitalists Baron Rothschild 
and Barney Barnato, each giving a sum of 100 guineas. The combined funds were cabled by 
the London newspaper.
179
 Funds were also sent from officials in Bulawayo, then Southern 
Rhodesia with the amount of £100 being sent through the Reuter‟s fund.180  
 
Not all the messages from abroad were of a sympathetic tone. Writing from London, the Paul 
Mall Gazette criticised any future inquiry into the disaster, saying that it doubted that there 
would be strict inquiry: 
 
“We are not likely to know whether the fault lay with the dynamite in 
general, with the Dutch railway company, or in the German-Franco-Dutch 
dynamite monopoly, but is has been notorious for months that this 
monopoly has supplied a very bad quality of dynamite, and that there have 
been no ordinary sane regulations as to the carriage of the explosive. This is 
the worst, but by no means the first, disaster attributable to the lamentable 
government of the Transvaal, and it is not likely to be the last.”181     
 
This piece was by no means pro-Transvaal government, and represents the stance taken by 
many of the British press during this time. Many Englishmen had in fact supported Jameson 
and the so called plight of the Uitlander on the Rand and thus a negative view of the 
Transvaal would have been expected.
182
 The press of the Cape Colony also maintain a critical 
outlook of the Rand during the circumstances, with another direct swipe being taken at the 
railway and dynamite concessions and at President Kruger who appointed them.
183
 It is 
noteworthy that The Star newspaper, which was based in Johannesburg, also held a critical 
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view of the Transvaal authorities. The newspaper was widely read by Uitlanders, and would 
often personally attack the president‟s character.184   
 
It can be seen that on the surface, the various external forces presented themselves in these 
early stages in either a sympathetic or critical way. For a deeper understanding into this 
context, one would have to consult the broader evidence of external attitudes towards the 
Transvaal Republic.    
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Chapter 4: Inquiries 
Phantom Detonators 
Any dynamite that was brought to the Rand needed detonators – blasting caps – to be set off 
or ignited in a controlled manner, this included the blasting gelatine. The dynamite trucks at 
the siding were suspected to have contained a division of detonator cases, additional to the 
cases of dynamite on board.
1
 The account of the detonators however is a bit hazy. Detonators 
were another import disguised as a product of the Dynamite Company, and arrived at Port 
Elizabeth via ship within wooden crates. The crates then travelled by wagon to Leeuwfontein, 
Pretoria where they were sorted and “put in order”. The importing costs were also paid there.2 
The detonators were then sent to the Rand by train or to other clients by wagon. Occasionally 
dynamite and detonators would be transported on the same wagon but this occurred rarely – 
and they were never to be delivered on the same train truck. Furthermore, a special permit 
was needed to unload detonators.
3
  
 
The office of E. Lippert was expecting a shipment of detonators on Monday the 17
th
 of 
February. Prior to this it was reported, that detonators had been delivered on the 26
th
 of 
January 1896, with more arriving several days later. William Langley arrived at the 
magazines around 9:45 a.m., later than usual, because he had to hand in logistical information 
concerning the detonators at the Revenue Office.  He was not told exactly where the 
detonators were, but he assumed that they arrived with the dynamite, as “explosives were 
always arriving”. For some reason Langley assumed that there would be 90 cases of 
detonators, but later he found out that only 40 cases had arrived. He was also unsure whether 
the detonators had come from the factory. However Langley never received these detonators 
due to the circumstances surrounding the delivery delay and then the explosion that took 
place. After the explosion he did receive additional detonators and they were in order. As far 
as Arthur Rutherford, chief magazine caretaker knew, the dynamite and the detonators were 
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on separate trucks and that only one truck contained detonators, but also that he did not know 
what happened to these devices.
4
  
 
Two day after the explosion, two locomotive machinists came across three detonators inside a 
collapsed house. They found the detonators intact and seemingly new as if no fire had 
touched it. A small crowd had gathered around this scene, but all were afraid to get any closer 
to the detonators. The two handed over the devices to a police detective who took matters 
further.
5
 Further such discoveries were made and noted by mining engineer, Max Francken, 
who found detonators, dynamite and fuses at different places around the debris. He also 
found out that three detonators were discovered around the Rand Timber Co. mill, but this 
had been cleared before he could investigate. On the 21
th
 of February, a policeman 
discovered an unexploded charge of dynamite within a pipe, and noticed glycerine oozing 
from the charge. Not much further away, a carriage narrowly missed riding over another 
unexploded charge. It was also thought that there was concealed dynamite underneath the 
crater that had been buried there by the force of the explosion.
6
 On February 28 Francken was 
still finding explosive devices – a bag containing different sizes of dynamite and fuses was 
found lying around. Inside, some of the contents were broken and others still whole. Thirty-
nine detonators were initially found, but Francken was concerned about the eleven detonators 
missing that would make up the one hundred that would be in a box. He received an 
additional box of detonators from the police barrack; another twelve: five wrapped in a piece 
of paper and the other seven in another piece of paper; the office of the Mining 
Commissioner was also in possession of found detonators. However not all the detonators 
found were believed to have come from the destroyed trucks – several were found whose 
packaging did not correspond with others that were found.
7
  
 
On the 5
th
 of March more discoveries were made. During the clearing debris, a search party 
found unexploded detonators and a cartridge of dynamite. It was concluded that because of 
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the position they were found in, the devices must have come from the destroyed dynamite 
trucks. Further circumstances surrounding the structure where the discovery was made added 
to the mystery. The roof of the house was iron, and this had been secured by strong beams 
that ran across. The detonators were found on the roof that had fallen in, but there was no 
dent upon the iron sheet. This was strange, because the sheet would have landed there by 
force. Another peculiar circumstance was that the dynamite was only marginally broken and 
its covering was loose, coupled with the fact that it did not go off further adds questions.      
 
The origin of the detonator on the dynamite trucks can be linked to what took place in 
Pretoria. What had happened was that a train carrying fifty cases of detonators, had arrived 
there by mistake – it was mean to go to the Rand. Ten of the cases were already delivered by 
wagon to the dynamite factory in Leeuwfontein. At the time the secretary of the factory, 
Gerard Rissik, was returning from business in Pretoria, and could not inform his workers that 
this delivery was a mistake. When he arrived back at the factory and found out what had 
happened, he immediately exclaimed that the cases had to returned to the Rand, and that the 
ten cases already at the factory would have to stay there. The forty cases that were still on the 
train trucks were therefore transferred to a truck of the Railway Company – this is why 
Langley was told to expect forty cases of detonators.  The Director of the Dynamite Factory 
in Leeuwfontein, Friedrich Krieger, maintained his stance that detonators and dynamite were 
usually not transported together, but that the if detonators were sent with the dynamite it was 
not a mistake, it would have been a conscious decision.
8
 Run by Friedrich Krieger, the chain 
of command at the factory was as follows: Joseph Buggiella, an Italian, supervised the 
cartridge department, an Italian woman under him, possibly his wife or relative, inspected the 
quality of the cartridges. The labour force was predominantly black and these workers were 
overseen by an old white packer.
9
 
 
The account involving the detonators is confusing, but it can be accepted that there were in 
fact detonators in a single truck and that these had either travelled with the dynamite or as 
stated in another account the dynamite trucks were shunted alongside the already present 
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detonators.
10
 Yet those who produced it, worked with it, and subsequently took part in the 
investigation, did not believe that its presence was related to the cause of the explosion. 
Krieger elaborated on his opinion of the collision, and said that it was unlikely, that this 
caused the explosion, that the force of collision would have had to been very powerful to 
cause an explosion. He also said that a collision involving trucks that contained both 
dynamite and detonators, would not necessarily be at risk of exploding and that the 
conditions would also have to exceptional. One significant thing he did say was that the 
explosion happened during the unloading of the dynamite and he expressed his knowledge of 
the way in which the cases were handled by the men who unloaded it. He did not say 
anymore but it can be assumed from his tone, that the handling of dynamite cases were less 
than appropriate.
11
 Furthermore, when Clemm repacked the trucks did the dynamite and the 
detonators perhaps then land up on the same trucks?          
 
 
Counting the Costs 
“The names of the dead convey no significance to the general public, only to 
the poorer Transvaal Dutch.”12 
When the trucks loaded with dynamite exploded, an unknown number of individuals that 
were in and around the railway yard simply “disappeared”, or were blown to pieces. Some 
fragments of human remains were found afterwards and some family members could actually 
identify some of these, as well as pieces of clothing in some cases.
13
 Other families had a 
lifeless body they could point to, while not all the deaths occurred instantly on the day, many 
would perish later that day, and the days to follow.
14
 The lists of killed and injured persons 
that were compiled by the Sanitary Board and handed over to the State Secretary and 
President, stands as a unique source, because it does not include everyone, particularly the 
List of Injured Persons.
15
 It should be noted, that these official lists of dead and injured 
contained annotation where it is clarified that the lists were not accurate, that deaths occurred 
that cannot be accounted for, and that some of the injured were not treated at the same place – 
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some were treated at private homes.
16
 Many of the milder injuries were discharged on the 
same day, and others in the days following, so when would the names of these people have 
been recorded? This becomes clear when the names of the injured at hospitals were released 
to the press on February 20, and while several of these names appears on the list of the 
Sanitary Board, there are many that do not, and several that the list has in addition.
17
    
 
Two lists were initially released by the press, one under the heading “Injured” (was released 
at noon on 20
 
February) and another under the heading “The Injured at Hospital” (late 
edition, 20 February), and both lists have names that the official list does not.
18
 It is unknown 
when the official lists were written (see Appendixes 9 and 10), but it can be assumed that it 
was after the press release, and that the names that appear on both lists were of longer term 
injuries, and the ones that do not appear on the official list, but in the press release, were 
shorter term injuries. When the two lists of the press release are added together they give a 
combined total of 138 injuries, and what is strange is the total of the official list is also 138 
injuries. When the names that appear on both the press release and the official list are omitted 
from the former, the total is 117. Adding this to the total of the official list equals 255 injured 
individuals. This is by no means the precise amount of people injured but it is roughly the 
numbers that the media and officials believed it to be. Newspapers initially reported that 
around 200 people were killed, with about 300 injured.
19
   
 
On the evening of February 22 (Saturday) the Sanitary Board had the number of dead at 62 
with four boxes of mixed remains.
20
 By noon on Sunday this number had risen to 88 dead, as 
more bodies were discovered.
21
 The official list put the final total at 84, which similarly to the 
total amount of wounded is redundant, because there were cases where individuals had to be 
buried before they were identified, and as mentioned before, cases where people were blown 
to pieces.
22
 Deaths that can be acknowledged, but are not mentioned in the lists were that of 
Clemm the foreman who was in charge of the wagon drivers and the delivery of the 
explosives, who would have been present at the unloading; Hendrik Dirk de Bruyn a young 
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railway worker who was assisting with the unloading; and the unnamed labourer who was 
instructed to sit on the front of the shunting train. All three were never seen again, although a 
family member of de Bruyn‟s, claimed to have recognized a piece of his remains.23 There 
were certainly several cases like this where people were believed to have been killed but not 
acknowledge on paper. The lists do not mention missing persons as among dead, probably 
because there was no way to prove that many of them were dead, as well as no way to prove 
that they were living. The families of the missing would of course remember, as was seen in 
the grief of those gathered around the coffins of mixed remains.
24
 The monument in memory 
of the victims, that will be discussed later, only speaks of 75 white and coloured deaths, 
possibly with the omission of the black victims. Yet according to the official list, eleven 
black people perished, and when this number is subtracted from both the press released and 
official list, the totals are 77 and 71 respectively.
25
 These totals include the partial white 
bodies found.
26
 It is possible that 75 was simply rounding up to the nearest five.  
 
Months after the event, when the Dynamite Relief Fund issued its report, it stated that 245 
people had been treated at the Johannesburg Hospital and the Wanderers. Of these 245, 63 
died at these centres, however it was reiterated that many who were admitted were brought in 
dying. With this information one can estimate that there were around 21 or 25 people 
(depending on which list you use) who were killed instantly – and of course these were 
bodies that had been recovered.
27
 This is done by subtracting the 63 who died at the hospitals 
from the overall total given to have been killed.  
 
A correspondent for The Cape Argus reported that many white people had been killed and 
injured by the explosion, but that this was a small number when compared to the native 
victims.
28
 When consulting the official lists, black victims, only numbered eight injured and 
eleven killed. This is significantly less than whites who were listed as killed or injured. 
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Needless to say that numerous people were blown to pieces, making it impossible to find or 
identified them afterwards, and this would have included black and white people. However 
given the political situation of the Transvaal and the social status afforded to Africans, one 
could come to the conclusion that the exact number of dead or injured blacks was simply of 
no concern to the officials. Therefore many more could have been killed than specified in the 
lists – but then why mention those few at all?  Clearly the rationale on this subject was 
neither here nor there.  
 
According to which list is consulted, the names of victims were occasionally spelt differently 
or misspelt, and this created the problem of there being an additional person, when really it 
was the same person. Four occurrences such as these posed an issue for this research – among 
the dead listed in the Cape Times was a J. Mahin, a nine year old male. The only name that 
was comparable on the official lists was a J. Mehem, who was 69 years old and of an 
unknown nationality, it is possible that they are they are same person however the age factor, 
unless erroneous, comes into play.
29
 Another case, although the spelling differs dramatically 
was of a sixteen year old male named W. Risy in the press released list, and the only link to 
the official list was a W. Hoy also sixteen years and a short surname that ends with a “y”. 
Two other cases however seem more likely than the formerly stated.
30
 W. Swanepoel was 
mentioned among the dead in the newspapers, but a S. Swanepoel was mentioned in the list, 
both were 20 years old and male, and could very likely be the same person. Another instance 
was that of Ellen Viljoen, 27 years old, and the only other Viljoen on the official list was 
Elsie Viljoen, a female of an unknown nationality, and no age was specified. Whether or not 
these eight people are related in anyway, does not really matter, because the number of 
casualties in the case of this disaster can never be accurate.
31
 What is important, is that one 
can arguably see the flaws in the process of identifying the dead. There were also 
discrepancies with the age of certain victims, for example the press release said a victim was 
31 years of age, while the official list said 41 years.
32
 Mistakes such as these do not pose a 
large problem, but they do show further inconsistencies in the gathering of data by officials.  
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For the purposes of this thesis, the statistic drawn up by the Sanitary Board, which is known 
to be inaccurate, will be used to present the demographics of those killed and injured. Four 
tables had been written, two for white victims, and two for non-white victims, one for the 
dead and one for the injured of both classifications.  The white names were subcategorised 
into those who were citizens of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, the Cape Colony, 
England and unknown nationalities, the latter only being necessary in the case of the dead. It 
did occur, that one or two individuals who were killed or injured were from an additional 
country, and these were just noted and added in the final tallying.  Non-white lists contain the 
names of Malays, Cape Coloureds (Cape Colony), Africans and Chinese, with the addition of 
two Arabs who were killed.  The injured lists were the most complete, with name, ages and 
gender given, and of course it was easier to collect this information when the victims were 
alive to give it. The lists of dead on the other hand were not as informative, there were 
instances of only a surname being given and several ages were omitted, gender on the other 
had been mostly specified.  
 
Of the injured persons
33
:  
- 22 were between the ages of 3 months
34
 and 10 years;  
- 26 were between the ages of 11 and 20 years;  
- 20 were between the ages of 21 and 30 years; 
- 40 were between the ages of 31 and 50 years; 
- 11 were over 50; 
- 19 were of unspecified ages. 
 
Of those who were killed
35
: 
- 15 were between the ages of 2 months
36
 and 10 years; 
- 7 were between the ages of 11 and 20 years;     
- 4 were between the ages of 21 and 30; 
- 3 were between the ages of 31 and 50; 
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- 6 were over 50; 
- 47 ages were unknown, rendering a thorough analysis impossible.  
 
Amid the dead around 29 were female (children and adults), while around 39 were specified 
as male (children and adults), 14 were unstated genders, however it can be assumed that these 
individuals were male because of their names, race and proximity of the unnamed with these. 
Thus the total males killed would be around 52. The injured consisted of 68 females and 70 
males. In both the cases of age and gender the reports were generally incorrect, where they 
said that the victims were mostly women and children. A lot of women and children were 
killed, injured, displaced and affected in ways that cannot be quantified, but many of the 
injured and dead were above 21 years of age and were mostly male, but not by no means a 
large margin. The presence of men who were of the working age and who were at home 
during the day, was not a strange manifestation on the Rand as many men were unemployed. 
In one case many former Afrikaner transport riders had found their livelihoods taken with the 
railway revolution of 1895, rendering thousands of them permanently unemployed. Several 
hundreds of these would move into the working class areas of Fordsburg and Vrededorp.
37
 
Therefore the presence of men during the explosion would have anticipated.  Also to be noted 
is that the youngest person injured was three months old and the oldest person was 78 years 
old, whereas the youngest death was two months and the oldest was 71 years.  
 
The subtotals were subcategorised into following nationalities and races:
38
 
Injuries: 
 
- Transvaal Burghers: 26 male; 26 female;  
Total: 52 
 
- Cape Colony: 12 male; 18 female;  
Total: 30 
 
- Orange Free State: 3 male; 3 female;  
Total: 6 
 
- English: 9 male; 4 female;  
Deaths: 
 
- Transvaal Burghers: 21 male; 16 female; 
Total: 37 
 
- Cape Colony: 5 male; 6 female; 
Total: 11 
 
- Orange Free State: 1 male; 
 
- English: 1 male 
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Total: 13 
 
- German: 1 male; 1 female; 
Total: 2  
 
- Russian: 1 male; 
 
- American: 1 male 
 
- Malay: 6 male; 5 female; 
Total: 11 
 
- Cape Colony: 4 male; 5 female; 
Total: 9 
 
- Africans: 4 male; 4 female; 
Total: 8 
 
- Chinese: 3 male; 
 
- St. Helena: 1 female; 
 
- German: 1 female 
 
- Portuguese: 1 male 
 
- Greek: 1 male 
 
- Unknown Nationalities: 5 male; 5 female; 
Total: 10 
 
- Africans: 9 male, 2 partial bodies 
Total: 11 
 
- Cape Coloured: 2 male; 1 female; 
Total: 3 
 
- Malay: 1 male; 
 
Chinese: 2 males  
 
Arabian: 2 male 
 
2 partial bodies 
 
The presence of other nationalities on the lists such as American, German, Russian, Chinese, 
St. Helenian, Portuguese, Greek and Arabian adds another perspective into their presence on 
the Rand, and therefore their proximity to the poorer districts that were most affected by the 
explosion. The total population of Johannesburg was around 102 078 people in 1896.
39
 Thus 
in broader terms the percentage of the total population that were injured (based on the official 
list) would have only been 0.24%. The dead would have been about 0.08% of the population. 
Ultimately the deaths were of no real significance against the large and growing population of 
Johannesburg. In terms of the horrific way by which these people were killed it can be put 
forward that the psychology of the town was profoundly affected.
40
 In terms of infrastructure 
as well, the damage was far greater than the loss of life with final estimates being around one 
million pounds in damages.
41
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The Inquirers 
Calculations were made to determine the size of the aerial wave caused by the explosion. The 
approximate width appeared to have been 1500 yards (1.372 km), with 300 yards to the north 
of the point of the explosion, and 1200 yards to the south. The wave moved in a south-
easterly direction and eventually narrowed out at a point. The greatest force was said to have 
moved laterally, in the direction of north and south, and therefore a large portion of the 
Location and West Fordsburg were destroyed or badly damaged.
42
 It was explained that 
because of the geography of the area, many houses to the east were spared:  
“The depression of the valley in the eastward sweep off the stream of force 
(which was, of course, undulatory
43
) lessened the impact and thus it was 
that houses to the east and within the same radius as the Location (for 
instance) did not suffer so much”44        
The sound of the explosion travelled at 1.110 feet per second and was accelerated by the 
voluntary of the dynamic force created. The sound was heard to the east in Boksburg in mere 
seconds, as well as to the west at the Randfontein Estates and Krugersdorp. Windows even 
rattled as far as Pretoria.
45
 It was surmised by experts that the aerial displacement must have 
been „tremendous‟.46 The damage to houses was consistent with that which would have been 
caused by the force of an air wave rather than that of an earthquake which would have 
affected the ground. This was because the walls of the houses fell inward rather than outward 
which at the time was a rule among valuators that indicated that damage was most likely not 
caused by an earthquake.
47
    
 
Among the first things President Kruger did upon being informed about the explosion, was to 
command that there be a formal investigation. This culminated into the Commission of 
Inquiry, which was appointed by government on the morning of February 21, and which had 
its first private assembly on February 26, 1896.
48
 The first order of business was to acquire 
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three cases of dynamite to examine, while proceedings were adjourned until March 4
th
, when 
the first witnesses were to be questioned in the Circuit Court.
49
 Eventually seven cases that 
were part of the shipment that exploded but had been delivered to the magazines just as the 
disaster took place, were secured for the purposes of expert examinations. The Committee 
went about planning their approach and programme with regard to collecting evidence and 
visiting the scene of the incident, and it was expect that the Commission would see over 
twenty witnesses and or more if so required.
50
 As stated earlier, public opinion was not 
completely convinced about how effective the Commission would actually be, and were 
disappointed with the selection of Railway Commissioner to the committee, but pleased with 
the appointed of Klimke.
51
  The first sitting was overseen by J. Smit as chairman along with 
J. L. van der Merwe (Mining Commissioner), J. F. de Beer (Railway Governing 
Commissioner), J. Klimke (State Mining Engineer), and F. C. Bouguenon as secretary. The 
Lawyers present at the hearings, represented the major players involved, namely the Railway 
Company (Proc. Lingbeek), the Dynamite Company (Adv. De Villiers and Proc. Hudson), E. 
Lippert (Proc. Hofmeyer), the Railway Order Service (Proc. Mullins) and the Johannesburg 
public itself (Proc. Morkel).
52
  
 
The morning session of March 4
th
, began with the two minor testimonies of C. Nel and a 
Kerstin Small. Their input was minimal yet both had witnessed the explosion from 
reasonably close, had been injured and suffered extensive property damage.
53
 They real 
contribution was the identification of hearing the train‟s crash. A third witness, Alex Bennett, 
stated that there was probably a case of mistaken identity with his summons to testify; as he 
had not been in Braamfontein at the time of the explosion and that there was another Bennett 
living in the town. He was questioned about detonators, but this further confirmed that the 
Commission was looking for the other Bennett, as he, also an Alex Bennett, had found three 
detonators a few days after the explosion.
54
 The first really significant witness of the morning 
was Joseph Williams, the previously discussed shunter of the Railway Company, who was at 
the railway yard during the explosion.
55
 It is clear that witnesses were treated differently 
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according to race – based on the circumstance that coloured witnesses were warned or 
threatened to tell the truth, while their white counterparts had to swear an oath to tell the 
truth. This was the case with most of the wagon drivers, who were coloured.
56
 Language was 
also a barrier as was in the case of Joseph Williams, which was the only indication of an 
interpreter, and surely it could not have been the only case, as Oxer claimed he did not under 
the language of the railway signs and rules.
57
 
 
The Commission examined 57 witnesses (see Appendix 12), which included average eye 
witnesses who contributed their brief experiences but ultimately nothing towards finding the 
causes of the disaster. The most crucial witnesses were of course the employees and 
management staff of the Railway Company, the Dynamite Company and the Order Service.  
There were also expert witnesses who carried out supplementary examinations on the 
explosives and the related articles. J. R. Williams, a Johannesburg based chemist, carried 
examinations on the quantity patterns of the blasting gelatine, as well as the packaging of the 
explosives.
58
 Julius Loevy, another Johannesburg based chemist, carried out additional tests 
for the purpose of re-examination.
59
 Robert Tatlock, a Public Analyst and Gas Examiner for 
the city of Glasgow was on business in Johannesburg during the Inquiry and was asked to 
examine the secured blasting gelatine from the consignment that exploded.
60
 During the 
course of the inquiry evidence collected ranged from hand sketched maps, dynamite, cases, 
technical reports and copies of various related documents such as receipts and telegrams.
61
 
One such item was the existing instructions from the Dynamite Company, on how to safely 
use its explosive products (see Appendix 11).
62
  The Commission sat from March 4 to March 
20, with the final meeting of the committee taking place on April 2 1896.
63
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The final report of the Commission of Inquiry was given in twelve points. After the 
administrative and legal elaborations of the first two points, the Commission laid forth the 
findings of its examination.
64
 It began, that on the February 19 of 1896, there was an 
explosion at an emplacement of the Railway Company in Braamfontein, where 2214 cases of 
dynamite (blasting gelatine), weighing 50 lbs. each exploded with dire „consequences‟. It was 
explained, that through the research and analysis of the various facts, circumstances and 
testimonies demonstrated that the witnesses had failed to show what the direct cause of the 
explosion was. However it did specify that: “All the facts and testimonies indicate that the 
blast occurred through the negligence – be it jointly of severally – by the parties involved.” 
And that if the parties involved should be considered they were: a) the Railway Company, b) 
the Order Service and c) the Dynamite Company.
65
 They began with the Railway Company, 
and immediately identified the existence of its negligence, particularly the monitoring and 
securing of the railway switch and the line connecting to the dynamite siding. The 
Commission determined that all the witnesses agreed that the shunting train, going at 
regulation speed and on the wrong truck due to the incorrectly set railway switch, crashed 
into the dynamite trucks while the explosives were being unloading and at the moment of the 
collision the explosion took place. All of this was blamed on the neglect and indifference of 
the Railway Company‟s officials, and led the Commission to recommend that dynamite 
grounds be immediately moved to a place of greater safety. This made up the fourth point of 
the Commission‟s report.66  
 
The fifth point dealt with the instructions given to subordinates of the Railway Company 
concerning the handling and treatment of hazardous and explosive substances, of which the 
Commission found to be completely unsatisfactory. The notification of transfer of explosives 
by the Company to recipients in Johannesburg and vice versa was also criticised for being 
unsatisfactory. The Company‟s official in charge of the delivery of dynamite came under 
personal criticism for not having exercised significant control over his subordinates and his 
testimony was in no way found to be acceptable. It was reported that at an earlier stage 
detonators had been transported on the same wagons as the dynamite and that repeatedly 
there were instances where the cases would fall on the ground during offloading. The reports 
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were not disputed and the Commission cautioned that there should not be a repetition of the 
practice.
67
  
 
The sixth point centred on the Order Service and their activities. The Commission admitted 
that the weight of the evidence and probability was on the side of the Order Service, and 
came to the conclusion that no one was present to receive the dynamite. It was further 
discussed that the occurrence whereby the dynamite had to be returned to the station, was not 
the first time it had happened, as two other incidences were identified by the testimonies.
68
 
Emphasis was then placed on the employee of E. Lippert, certainly William Langley, who 
was considered to have not only made a costly mistake, but further compromised the conflict. 
As well as the differences in testimonies concerning the alleged time the magazine caretakers 
were meant to be at their posts. However the Commission had no doubt that was it not for the 
unnecessary delay on the part of the Order Service, the explosion would never have 
happened. As stated it was therefore very regrettable that the Order Service stopped transport 
until the Wednesday, for the small sum of £3 and although the dispute was settled, the 
damage was done.
69
                        
 
In the seventh point, the Commission shifted more attention to the office of the Selling Agent 
of the Dynamite Company – E. Lippert. The Commission believed that the combined actions 
of the Agent‟s office, in no small measure contributed to the explosion. As it was known by 
the office that dynamite had arrived on the 17
th
 of February and had to be unloaded and 
stored it should have been prepared for this purpose and taken more action. Yet the caretakers 
finally admitted they closed the warehouses and were not present during a certain period. 
Additionally the comments and attitude of Rutherford, the chief caretaker and representative 
of Lippert at the proceedings, where he stated that receiving a delivery before half past nine 
or on public holidays, was not convenient to him, were corroborated by other and were not 
contradicted. Other goods sellers were always prepared to receive deliveries from six o‟clock 
in the morning until five in the afternoon. Since it took about two to three days to deliver a 
regular train load of dynamite, the conduct of the Selling Agent within the circumstances was 
deemed to be careless and indifferent to the highest degree. Furthermore it was shown that 
the office of the Selling Agent cared little for what happened to the dynamite as long as it did 
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not have to pay the difference in freight cost (the £3). The Committee thus took it as being 
obvious that the office of Lippert did not take public safety into consideration but that its 
employees preferred to care for their own convenience.
70
 
 
In point eight the Commission discussed the findings of its expert witnesses with regard to 
the packaging of the dynamite. Through their findings it was established that the wooded 
cases were in fact „safe enough‟ and it was felt that this was proven by the fact that several 
cases had fallen off trolleys and broke without exploding. Yet it was stated that there was still 
room for structural improvement, with a specific emphasis on nails. It was acknowledged that 
during the closing of one of the cases, which involved the nailing of the wooden lids, a nail 
had been hammered at an incorrect angle and penetrated one of the dynamite bags. While this 
was considered to be of minimal risk, the lack of care was considered negligent, particularly 
since explosives were involved. As it was impossible to check the condition of the cases of 
the exploded dynamite, it had to be assumed that its structural integrity was of the same 
quality as the aforementioned. There had also been questions about the smudges on the inner 
walls of the cases, and this found to not be of nitro-glycerine but from gelatine, possibly from 
the hands of packers. While this was considered to not endanger the explosives, it was urged 
that better care be taken in the future to avoid these smudges. Although the conditions of the 
cases were not believed to have necessarily been detrimental to the explosives within them, 
the wood itself did not adhere to the regulations in Article 13 of Act. No. 16 of 1892, 
specifically the thickness of the wood and the lids of the cases. Inside the cases, the bags 
were tightly packed which prevented unnecessary movement, but there was no sawdust in 
between the bags as was specified in Article 12 of the above mentioned law.  It was believed 
that if the slight defects discovered on the cases that did not explode were also present on 
those that did, then there was a possibility that they could have cause the explosion. Yet again 
the behaviour of the Dynamite Company was pointed, with regard to their lack of full 
compliance with the law concerning explosives.
71
  
 
The ninth point briefly mentioned the fact that most of the Dynamite Company‟s products 
were imports from Europe, including the wood for the cases. The tenth point was another 
short explanation, this time of the Commission‟s response to the allegations of malice and 
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bribery that presenting itself during the inquiry. In short, the Commission acknowledged the 
existence of the allegations and probability of the misconduct, but that there was insufficient 
evidence to prove any of it.
72
 Thus the allegation of bribery against William Langley was 
disregarded.      
 
The penultimate point presented by the Commission of Inquiry summarised the experiments 
and results of the expert witnesses, with regard to the condition of the dynamite. The 
experiments performed by the examiners and which were singled out (but do not include all) 
were „the heat test‟, the „exudation test‟ and the „liquid test‟, as was prescribed in the English 
Law of 5 August 1875 (see Appendix 13 for Tatlock‟s full report). The results were that the 
blasting gelatine was acid free, and the experts were in agreement that its composition was 
normal consisting 92.70% nitro-glycerine, 7.20% collodion wool and 0.10% humidity, 
making up the 100% consistency of blasting gelatine. The explosives passed all the required 
stability tests and it was thus concluded by the Commission that the blasting gelatine in 
question met all the requisites to be considered a good product.
73
         
 
In closing the Commission drew attention once more to the statement of Tatlock following 
his investigation, which found the blasting gelatine to be salt-free. And it expressed that it 
was impossible that the explosives exploded due to the shock of the accident. Unless there 
was a mistake „here or there‟ or a „secret flaw‟ that allowed the collision to be the cause. 
Moving on, it reiterated the fact that there were several careless testimonies that revealed the 
indifferent behaviours that that could have led to the explosion. Still the Commission 
recognised that it failed to discover the direct cause. Adding that the reckless manner, under 
which the loading and unloading of the explosives was carried out, was another possible 
cause but that this was impossible to establish as all of the people who would have done the 
loading in question and would have witnessed it „disappeared‟.74 As seen in the Commission, 
there were many small yet significant occurrences and suggestions that could possibly have 
led to a more direct conclusion had more evidence and witnesses survived. On the other hand 
more witnesses could have potentially complicated an already fickle collection of 
testimonies. Thus what they had was not enough and what was lost was potentially crucial. 
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Causes Revisited 
It can be argued that there was not one cause for the explosion, but a combination of mistakes 
and follies – 1) on arrival the dynamite could not be immediately offloaded and delivered as 
was regulation; it was then moved to the Braamfontein Station siding. 2) An attempt was 
made to deliver the dynamite but there was no one to receive it at the magazines. 3) Further 
delivery was strained and halted by conflict over the payment of the delay – £3. 3) The 
dynamite remained in the trucks for three and half days during February, which is known for 
its high temperatures, and it was said to be a very hot week; additionally no one can know for 
sure if this could have degraded it, even though blasting gelatine is one the safest explosives 
to handle. Could the constant transport back and forth also have led to its degrading? 4) 
When the dynamite was repacked after the failed delivery, was it packed correctly and 
safely? 5) The presence of detonators on the train, although on a separate truck complicates 
matters as well, especially when one considers the repacking and whether or not the dynamite 
or the detonators landed up on the same truck then. 6) Eventually an agreement was reached 
and the offloading and delivery of the dynamite commenced. The routine of the packing of 
the dynamite was also criticised for being reckless and thus dangerous.  7) The incorrectly set 
railway switch that lead to the collision of the truck beings shunted and the dynamite trucks, 
was ultimately the final nail in the coffin as directly after this the explosion occurred. The 
accident occurred during the offloading of the dynamite. 8) Following the blast, various 
explosive articles were found, such as unexploded dynamite, detonators and fuses. One 
article of dynamite was noted to be oozing gelatine. There were also several claims that the 
dynamite was of a poor quality. 9) Following the investigation, the blasting gelatine was 
found to be of a sound quality, unless an extraordinary flaw was present or there was a crucial 
with the dynamite that exploded and hence could not be identified.      
 
Earlier, the theory of Hedley Chilvers was discussed where he linked the causes of the 
explosion to the Jameson Raid and the Reform Committee, whereby the dynamite that arrived 
had nowhere to go as there was no sufficient packing space, due to the loss of both Hosken‟s 
favour and magazines.
75
 However by consulting the notes on the Commission of Inquiry, it 
becomes clear that the reasons for the explosion may have been far more simplistic and 
avoidable than a link to the Jameson Raid. While Chilvers‟s argument makes sense, it is 
shown through the testimonies of the management of both the Railway Company and the 
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office of Lippert that this was not the first delay in the delivery of dynamite, as there had 
been miscommunication or quarrels between the two offices prior to the Jameson Raid.
76
 
Therefore dynamite that had been standing at railway stations for any amount of time was not 
new. Although the loss of the use of Hosken‟s magazines would have caused some logistics 
issues for Lippert, the fact that his office insisted that the dynamite be delivered after the 
initial delay of delivery on February 17
th
, implies that they indeed wanted the dynamite and 
had space for it.
77
 However the office of Lippert was not beyond lying or manipulation, and 
could have made these claims to save face, as was the case with one of its employees who 
was accused of bribery.
78
 It is also possible that during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 of February, 
dynamite was distributed from the magazines to clients and thus space was quietly made 
available.      
 
A very short opinion piece in The Cape Argus, places the blame firmly on the Railway 
Company, calling their conduct that of a “gross carelessness and ignorance”, and “silly and 
grotesque, while causing a serious waste of time and power”.79 Further opinions were given 
whereby the qualifications of the Railway Commissioner were criticised, saying that the only 
reason he got the job was because he knew absolutely nothing about the railway.
80
 It was 
recounted that President Kruger‟s anger was also initially directed at the Railway Company.81 
This was the most logical answer, as the disaster happened within the grounds of the 
Company, and it was also their negligence that led to the accident. The Railway Company 
employees, who were involved with the shunting, themselves did not know who was at fault 
for the accident and therefore explosion. There was however minor finger pointing between 
Oxer and Williams (foreman-shunter and shunter respectively), as to responsibilities and 
ability. Oxer specified that he placed Williams near the front of the train so that the 
responsibility of lookout was off of him, yet he said that if he was in that position he would 
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have seen the error immediately. Williams on the other hand stated that ultimately it was 
Oxer‟s responsibility as head shunter to inspect and secure the switch.82  
 
Earlier it was mentioned that Friedrich Krieger, Director of the dynamite factory at 
Leeuwfontein, had commented about the way in which men unloaded dynamite and it was 
assumed that this was carried out in hazardous and inappropriate fashion. In addition to this it 
was revealed that many of the workers who offloaded the dynamite had no experience in this 
task. One young man, Hendrik Dirk de Bruyn, was twenty years old, and had been working 
for the Railway Company for only three months when the explosion took place. His sister 
told newspapers that he had little or no experience with explosives and would not have fully 
understood its dangers. The young man was said to be quite strong, with interest and 
experience in weightlifting, so he would definitely have been able to lift a heavy case of 
dynamite. It was stated that he had at work from 6 a.m. on the 19
th
, with the explosion taking 
place at around 3:15 p.m. – a combination of inexperience and fatigue could have played a 
part here in negligence, however impossible to take further.
83
 Referring again to the eye 
witness account of the actually unloading methods employed by the railway workers, where 
cases of dynamite were thrown from the train onto the wagons, the negligence of the Railway 
Company, in combination with its Order Service wing becomes further apparent.
84
 Yet the 
Railway Company was not the only guilty party. The Dynamite Company was lapse in its 
regulations and care of its product and the public. With the understanding that dynamite is a 
dangerous product and a potentially volatile one, the Company should have to be more 
careful in its activities and attitudes. In the mines accidents involving explosives occurred due 
to the same reasons – negligence and carelessness – however many miners who used the 
dynamite were untrained, thus who was really to blame, the miner or the officials who were 
responsible for training them in the correct and safe way to handle explosives.
85
    
 
It cannot be denied that the final known act before the explosion was the shunting accident. 
Anything that happened during the offloading of the dynamite cannot be known. One can 
guess and speculate in relation with the various opinions and possibilities that are based on 
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facts, but there is no tangible evidence that proves that something happened there. Thus as 
this thesis cannot prove one singular cause, other than providing speculation and theory,  the 
causes of the explosion exist as preconditions rather, a set of events that with each step made 
the explosion further possible. If the dynamite was of a poor and unstable quality then that 
would be one of the first links in the chain, but then the dynamite concession cannot be 
ignored. As a monopoly no other manufacturer was allowed to produce or sell explosives on 
the Rand. Therefore the market competitiveness that would have existed, had there been no 
monopoly would have not only created competitive prices, but also possibly a higher quality 
of product, as competitors would have naturally endeavoured to out sell each other. 
 
The sphere of transportation and handling would be the next step. There were no regulations 
on the transportation of explosives, and this fact showed. Often wagon loads of dynamite 
would speed though town, with only one driver to supervise it, while he would be smoking 
and his knowledge of dynamite, though unknown, would have minimal or non-existent. 
There were also observations of pipe smoking around dynamite cases, however if this 
occurred during the offloading of the dynamite in question cannot be proven either.
86
  As 
said, several times the careless nature of the handling of dynamite was also a potential aspect 
for disaster. Skipping over the rest of the „preconditions‟ that have similarly already been 
discussed, one comes again to the shunting accident, the final act of incompetence, and it will 
be left as such until more can be proven about the direct cause of the Braamfontein 
Explosion. However there is doubt about that ever happening.           
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Chapter 5: Consequences 
Immediate Repercussions 
Apart from vast destruction and pointless deaths of numerous people, there were other 
immediate repercussions following the explosion. One of the first tasks undertaken by the 
officials of Johannesburg, namely the Sanitary Board, was to request that all dynamite be 
removed from the town and that a magazine site and dynamite siding be built 5 miles to the 
north.
1
 The immediate and temporary solution was that all dynamite be removed from the 
town, and that companies who required dynamite were to order and received delivery from 
the Modderfontein factory – this would have been transported via ox wagon as there was no 
railroad between the towns at that point.
2
 However Kruger‟s initial reaction was to prohibit 
all dynamite from entering the Rand, but very soon had to withdraw this decision due to the 
significant effect it would have had on the mining industry.
3
 The day after the explosion, 
government instructed all firms with dynamite stores in the district of Braamfontein, to have 
it removed within four hours. It cannot be certain whether the firms fully complied with the 
time limit given, but by the following Tuesday (25 February), all dynamite had been removed 
to the farm of Rietfontein, which had been set aside for this very purpose.
4
    
  
It was revealed during the Commission of Inquiry, that around 78 men had been killed in 
1895 due to accidents involving explosions, while 113 were said to have been injured. The 
predominant cause of these accidents was carelessness during the placing of explosive 
charges or failing to remove unexploded cartridges. Ironically the Dynamite Company itself 
had a complaint about explosives, after it had frequently found cartridges of still whole 
dynamite in its supplied coal. Following the disaster, it was announced that stricter 
regulations were going to be implemented relating to the handling of explosives. The 
regulations would not be as stringent as later laws would be and the mines themselves had 
much to learn about safety precautions. Yet there was a visible improvement of the 
previously careless attitude towards dynamite albeit be it now fear. Along with the new found 
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fear came criticism by the people of Johannesburg, who believed that the German dynamite 
was to blame for the disaster and they were vocal about this opinion.
5
 However before the 
people of the Rand had settled into a quieter condemnation there was real anxiety – and with 
the fires that occurred in the days after the explosion, their nerves were pushed to their 
limits.
6
 One scenario involved a fire at the ill-fated goods station, where the site of the smoke 
alone alarmed the town who rushed to the site. The fire brigade were also promptly on the 
scene, but it was the disturbed words of a junior railway official that completely frightened 
everyone. He pointed to the nearby trucks and explained anxiously that they contained 
dynamite. When the firemen directed their hoses towards the trucks, the crowd that had 
gathered realized what this precaution was for and quickly bolted in all directions. After some 
time the firemen turned off their hoses and went to inspect the trucks, to find nothing but 
empty bags that had previously contained coal.
7
   
 
Whereas most people were nervous about their surroundings, others found business 
opportunities within the setting of death and destruction. Among the many window casualties 
was the large front window of the Stuttafords department store in Johannesburg, and like 
many of the other windows, replacing it was a challenge. Among the quests of rescue and 
recovery, the task of replacing glass was not an immediate priority.
8
 Herbert Evans, a house 
decorator originally from Natal, saw an opportunity for decorating houses. He telegraphed 
every establishment that traded in glass panes and acquired all of it. He therefore effectively 
held the monopoly of window repairs throughout Johannesburg, and was eager to make the 
best of the situation.
9
 Thus a small concession would even come out this account of a disaster 
influenced by concessions. 
 
It was assumed by the press that the rebuilt suburbs would take on a modern look, 
emphasising the architecture of the working class.
10
 Due to the funds collected by the Relief 
Committee in aid of the victims, many would have their previous living environments 
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upgraded from iron sheets to brick walls.
11
 Thus being a part of broader Johannesburg‟s 
evolution from iron dwellings to brick buildings, which all started with the canvas tents of the 
early mining camp.
12
 Once the Relief Committee had time to consider the funds that had been 
collected, it decided that it would go about the rehousing of the victims. In accordance with 
the Committee‟s intentions of practically assisting the victims with the funds rather than 
simply presenting them with money, came the situation where they actually selected the types 
of homes to be built.
13
 After requests for tenders, the plans of the houses were decided upon 
and three classes were chosen to be built by the construction firm, Munro & Co.:
14
 
- Class 1 contained two rooms and a kitchen, a stone foundation and necessary accessories; of 
which 51 were built, costing £150.12s each. 
- Class 2 had three bedrooms and a kitchen, along with the previously mentioned foundation 
and accessories; 42 were built, costing £172.15s each. 
- Class 3 had four rooms and a kitchen, with foundation and accessories; 22 were built, 
costing £186.15s.
15
  
 
All house classes were complete with wood and iron ceilings. Three „special houses‟ were 
also built to the cost of £247.66s each, more than the other three, and one expected that these 
were probably more advanced. Funds were also allocated to the rebuilding of Churches and 
Homes of all denominations, this amounted to £7195.18s.
16
 This thesis does not go further 
into the expenses of the building of these houses or the labour used, however it will say that 
the total of all of this, including furniture, came to £63 215.13s.
17
  
 
The other expenses of the Relief Committee were amassed as follows: 
- Funerals: £702.13s 
- Medical fees: £1560.8s 
- Medical stores: £528.1s 
- Cab and cart hire: £1403.1s 
- Temporary hire of rooms, and sundry purchases including livestock: £2597 
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- Relief Depot Expenditure: 
Wanderers: £3187.19s 
Show Yard: £8775.12s 
Fordsburg: £5787.7s 
Central Office: £2314.19s 
- Office expenses: £696.3s 
- Office furniture: £74.8s 
- Claim investigation expenses: £516.5s 
- Legal expenses: £215.14s 
 
Total expenses came to £93 847.3s, with cash in the bank and in hand being £32 556, making 
up the £126 399.3s that was collected.
18
    
 
 
Remembrance 
A monument in the memory of the white and coloured victims of the explosion was erected 
by the Relief Fund Committee, at the Braamfontein Cemetery, (today the Enoch Sontonga 
Memorial Park
19
). The over two metre high traditional phalanx was inscribed with the 
following: 
 
“This monument is erected by the subscribers to the Dynamite Disaster 
Relief Fund To the memory of all those who lost their lives from the 
Dynamite Explosion at Braamfontein Station on February 19
th
 1896. The 
number who met their sad death from this cause, both whites and coloured 
was 75.”  
“Requiescant in pacem” 
 
At a time there was another monument to the explosion – a massive wheel from either a truck 
or locomotive was launched over Vrededorp by the force of the blast, and landed a mile away 
in the Agricultural Showground, where it pierced into the ground, concealing half of its body. 
This site was enclosed by a fence erected by the railway officials, and a small tablet placed on 
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the wheel, that conveyed the details of the explosion. Unfortunately this small memorial was 
removed by vandals during the Anglo-Boer War.
20
      
 
There is a record of Doctor Breyer, the Director of the State Museum in 1896, inquiring as to 
what would be done with the scrap caused by the explosion, possibly for a museum collection 
he wished to start.
21
 In 2012, Johannesburg based artist Eduardo Cachucho, exhibited his 
collection Looking Glass – Johannesburg 2012 and 1886-1896, and among the pieces was a 
worked entitled Explosion, 1896. The piece uses various photographs of the Braamfontein 
Explosion and superimposes them onto a 3D representation of the large crater left by the 
explosion.
22
 The artwork is a testament to the fact that this distinctive event still stirs a unique 
and sparing interest.  
 
A few metres south of the three sidings of Braamfontein Station, was the train line to 
Krugersdorp which ran west – here the line bent slightly south before turning west again (See 
Appendix 1).
23
 Today the line still curves around this point, although the entire railway 
system is much larger, and more than one line now runs to Krugersdorp (See Appendix 14). 
The apex of this Krugersdorp bend is the closest point one can use to approximate the 
location of the Braamfontein Explosion today.
24
  
 
It would be curious to ask when this disaster became known as the Braamfontein Explosion, 
because as has been seen, the explosion affected more of Fordsburg and Vrededorp and 
newspapers referred to it as the explosion or disaster at Johannesburg. Furthermore, as was 
alluded to earlier in this thesis, a survey would most likely have to be carried out to determine 
the real statistics surrounding public knowledge about the Braamfontein Explosion. The 
suspicion is that many South Africans have never heard of the explosion, this includes the 
younger and older of population. Further historiographical research can similarly be done on 
the reasons why the explosion is rarely mentioned within the pantheon of Witwatersrand 
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history.
25
 Earlier, Schenk‟s reflections on „historical disaster research‟ were briefly discussed, 
and in his closing he mentions that perhaps the memory of disasters and the way in which 
they are forgotten is another crucial component to the field that should be addressed.
26
 This 
fits in with the concept of the forgotten-ness of the explosion, and supports the need to ask 
why.    
 
Albert Grundlingh discusses how milestone years such as centenaries, can be appealing for 
historians to reflect on certain events and their significance, as well as to present the level of 
existing historical work on specific topics.
27
 As 2016 marks the 120 year anniversary of the 
explosion, it has indeed become necessary for scholars to reflect on the significance of this 
event, or the lack thereof. With the designation as the “worst explosives accident in the 
history of South Africa”, and as “one of the most devastating and catastrophic accidents to 
have impacted” Johannesburg and its people, one can surely sense a significance.28 Yet to 
take this event and zoom out to include the organic nature of Johannesburg, would offer the 
most valuable historical work.    
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
For argument sake, one can consider the following facts. The Rand under the Transvaal 
government had granted concessions to various businesses, many of Dutch and German 
origin, chief among these monopolies were the Railway Company and the Dynamite 
Company.
1
 It went so far that the wood, of which the cases that held the explosives were 
made, was imported.
2
 Uitlander businessmen despised these establishments, as they were 
biased and imbalanced practices that led to higher prices for them and which they saw as a 
violation of the London Convention. The grievances of the Uitlanders were many, and would 
eventually come into contact with the interests of the British government. However before 
this, the Uitlanders organised amongst themselves and formed the Transvaal National Union 
in 1892, to present and advance the interests of the Uitlanders, who were predominantly 
British, to the Transvaal government of Kruger. By this point the Randlords were still content 
with their dealings with the Volksraad, by bribing officials and backing favourable 
candidates, however this was not to last.
3
 The Transvaal National Union had the question of 
franchise for the Uitlander at the top of their list, a proposal which Kruger viewed as the 
doom of the Transvaal. The National Union would be a precursor of the Johannesburg 
Reform Committee founded in 1895, having in its ranks some of the wealthiest businessmen 
on the Rand. The Committee supported the ill-fated Jameson Raid of 1895/1896, during 
which they took control of the „peace and security‟ of Johannesburg for a very brief time 
before handing it back to the Transvaal. After the Raid many of the committee members were 
arrested and tried, and some were executed for high treason.
4
 The failure of the Jameson Raid 
must have surely frustrated and humiliated the Reform Committee and the British officials 
who quietly backed it.  
 
Turning once again to the theory of Hedley Chilvers concerning the Jameson Raid and the 
fully occupied magazines, where he holds that if there had been no raid there would have 
been no explosion; that, coupled with the three days of heat and the attempted push from the 
shunter would have been enough to set the whole thing off.  Note that Chivers believes that 
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the shunter train had intended to couple with the dynamite trucks and therefore he did not 
know that the collision rather, was an accident. Chivers‟s theory is unique in that it links the 
Jameson Raid with the explosion; however it is flawed because Lippert‟s magazines did have 
space, as was expressed by dynamite company employees. Yet can more be made of a 
potential link with the Raid, or more specifically the National Union and the Reform 
Committee? Could members of the Committee have conspired to cause the explosion? Also, 
would they have used Uitlanders who had occupations within the concession companies?  
 
The policy of concessions was introduced by the Kruger regime shortly after 1881, and the 
concessions to follow were affectively monopolies, with their stated purpose being the 
“promotion of industrial development in the Transvaal”.5 In these early stages, Burghers and 
foreigners with influence could easily obtain these contracts from government, and their 
positions were later strengthened by the endorsement of the Volksraad. The early 
concessionaires were typically investors who intended to almost immediately sell their rights 
to others. It was only after the discovery of gold that Uitlanders began complaining about the 
concessions, in light of the new economic prospects at hand and their lack of participation in 
these now increasingly profitable concessions. In 1895 the Volksraad designated a committee 
to investigate and report on the manufacturing concessions, and it was found that most of the 
concessions from 1881 had failed with the exception of the dynamite, iron, liquor, leather, 
brick and paper manufacturers. The most controversial concessions were that of the 
dynamite, railways and liquor. The latter was criticized more for its noticeable effects on 
African miners than its monopoly, while the other two were known for their expensive prices 
of service and product.
6
 After the Jameson Raid, conditions remained much the same for the 
mines and bordered on worse. Around half of the 45 producing mines on the Rand were 
operating at a loss. The three hardest hitting punches for the mines were still the expensive 
rates of the Railway Company, especially for the transportation of coal, the high cost of 
dynamite, and the “scarcity and expensiveness of African labour.”7    
 
The National Union was initially made up of ordinary Uitlanders, many of whom were born 
in South Africa, and simply wanted to be full citizens. It however became more difficult to 
determine what portion of the Uitlanders were born in South Africa, as more foreign born 
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immigrants entered the Transvaal. The founding members and leaders of the National Union 
were of these South African born Uitlanders, and their desires were to secure their political 
rights – they had no intention of staging an armed revolution, but rather used politics and 
process to agitate the government. The exact numbers of the Union were never disclosed, but 
it was understood that it had little money and was virtually ignored by the mining and 
financial industries, who themselves were Uitlanders. Yet this was to change in 1895, as the 
whole dynamic of the Uitlander movement shifted.
8
 Earlier in 1894, it was found that the 
gold mines had a longer life expectancy that was originally known or assumed. This, along 
with the discoveries of profitable coal and iron deposits, changed the attitudes of the mining 
magnates, and they realized that they had a future on the Rand and in the Transvaal.
9
 The 
claims and grievances of the Uitlanders gained a stronger punch as the „capitalists‟ joined and 
soon led the National Union. Gone were the use of politics and due process and entered the 
realm of “revolutionary conspiracy”. The change of heart of the “capitalist” Uitlanders was 
based purely on financial gain, and they in fact cared little for politics and political rights. 
Their grievances were the policies of Kruger, that cost them money and reduced their profits 
– and they were determined to transformation this. The policies are the previously mentioned 
dynamite monopoly, railway concession, and the sphere of African labour, which they felt 
government did little about. The mine owners found these conditions to be unsatisfactory and 
it made it near impossible for them to operate the lower grade gold mine and to establish new 
ones. They felt that most of what Kruger did, with regard to them, was to at every corner 
increase the cost of their operations and thus reduce their profits which would have otherwise 
been significant. It was with this in mind that they decided that it was time for Kruger to go.
10
      
 
When the dynamite arrived on Sunday, the 16
th
 of February 1896 at Braamfontein, it was 
open topped and simply covered with sails, thus enduring the journey from Leeuwfontein like 
this. Additionally it was reported that there had been complaints about the dynamite around 
this time, saying that the paper around the dynamite was too thin and that it tore easily.
11
 That 
aside, the dynamite arrived either on the evening or the night at Park Station, but there was no 
one to collect it, probably because it was Sunday. The trucks were then moved to the siding at 
Braamfontein Station. On the Monday there was an attempt to deliver the dynamite to the 
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magazines of the Lippert, by the Order Service of the Railway Company. However when the 
first mule wagons arrived, there was no one present to receive the delivery.  The wagons 
eventually returned to the Station siding and the dynamite was repacked under the 
instructions of the foreman in charge of the delivery wagons and drivers, without any 
officials of the railway present. The dynamite would then endure the heat of February for 
three days. Later the office of Lippert queried about the dynamite and was told that the 
dynamite was delivered, but that no one was there to collect it and that it was returned to the 
trucks. Lippert‟s people insisted that there was someone at the magazines. Either way the 
situation became embroiled in a debate over the payment of the delivery delay, an amount of 
£3. The Order Service and the Railway Company maintained that it was the responsibility of 
Lippert to pay for the delay as there should have been someone to receive the dynamite. The 
office of Lippert maintained that there was someone there and that they would not pay a cent. 
Eventually the deadlock was broken by the Railway Company and the dynamite was 
promised to be delivered – this was on Wednesday the 19th. One should ask, where William 
Langley was, the caretaker who was supposedly absent and also present during the initial 
delivery of the dynamite. 
 
On the same day, 31 empty trucks were being shunted at the Braamfontein railway yard, from 
the goods station to one of the sidings. Joseph Williams, a shunter, was tasked with 
inspecting the railway switch, the mechanism that steers trains from one track onto another. 
Williams found this in order on his initial inspection and on his way to the trucks he noted a 
labourer cleaning the switch. Williams was told to be near the front of the train to act as 
lookout, as the locomotive pushed the trucks from behind. During the movement he was on 
the fourth truck from the front, and he instructed the labourer, who had cleaned the switch, to 
be on the first truck. Williams gave the signal to cross the switch and after crossing he 
immediately saw that the train was on the wrong siding – they were thus on the siding with 
the dynamite trucks. He gave a signal to stop, but the crew on the locomotive could not see or 
hear him at this point.
12
 Eventually the driver did notice the error and instructed the stoker to 
turn on the brake, but it was too late and the train crashed into the dynamite truck.
13
 One 
witness saw the trucks being overturned during the collision, after which the dynamite 
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exploded and the damage was done.
14
 After the collision, Williams fell off the train and 
further saw nothing of the explosion, the labourer on the other hand was never seen again. 
Yet why was Williams not on the front truck as he was instructed – why did he delegate this 
task to someone else? Furthermore could Williams not have seen that the switch was 
incorrectly set when he gave the signal to cross – the foreman shunter said that he would have 
noticed the error immediately if he was near the front of the train.
15
 
 
Both Langley and Williams can be seen to represent a fault within the Dynamite Company 
and the Railway Company respectively. The Order Service had a similar employee who 
committed an ultimately costly error – the delivery foreman, known only as Clemm, who was 
responsible for the delivery of the dynamite, should have waited until someone at the 
magazines showed up. Moreover, he should not have reloaded the dynamite onto the train 
himself, without the supervision of a railway official who would have had more experience in 
this matter, especially since dynamite in all its forms is an extremely dangerous cargo. 
Clemm, unlike the other two, was believed to have died in the explosion, as he was busy with 
the offloading, and would have been inches away from the epicentre. In addition to the 
mistakes of individuals, there were also broader mistakes committed. The dynamite trucks at 
the siding, contained a division of detonators, additional to the cases of dynamite on board.
16
 
There was also mention of missing detonators. This should not have been allowed as it 
created a potential risk during transportation. Secondly, the dynamite siding should never 
have been in the location it was, given its very close proximity to residential areas and 
locations – Braamfontein, Vrededorp, Fordsburg, the Brickfields and the various locations 
within these – the Indian, African, and Malay locations.17 There had been petitions to have 
these sidings moved along with the dynamite magazines, and these continued after the 
explosion, with the suggestion to move both to at least five miles from the town.
18
 Ironically 
there was another explosion in Krugersdorp, this time on the third level of the south reef, 
where only one person was killed. More alarmingly on the following morning, fifty tons of 
dynamite was found at a railway station in Pretoria, and had been there for several days. 
                                                 
14
 John Forth. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 13 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen van de 
Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, p. 25. 
15
 Sydney Oxer. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 18 March 1896. TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen van 
de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 29-30. 
16
 Arthur Rutherford. Testimony given at Commission of Inquiry. 5 March 1896, TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen 
van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, pp. 10-12. 
17
 Map of Braamfontein, c. 1896. 
18
 The Cape Times, 21 February 1896, “Frightful Catastrophe at Johannesburg,” p. 5. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
 
Precautions were not taken to guard the dynamite and it was unknown how the dynamite got 
there.
19
  
 
Could the frustrations of some Uitlanders, have led them to conspire to cause this explosion? 
The explosion discredits both the Railway Company and the Dynamite Company, who were 
both intimately involved in the events that led up to the event, who both bore most of the 
blame following the Commission of Investigation, and who both had state backed 
monopolies that were detested by the Uitlanders. There are coincidences within the case of 
the explosion that almost point to a broader conspiracy, but they end at the door of the two 
companies, because an insider would surely have to be involved, making such a conspiracy 
possible. What adds suspicion to Langley is the accusation of attempted bribery against him, 
by one of the Order Service drivers. However there was confusion and no supporting 
evidence for this. Williams on the other hand altered his task when he put someone else in 
front of the train, instead of himself. When he fell off the train he fell into a ditch and was 
mostly shielded from the blast. While testifying, he said that it was Oxer‟s (the foreman 
shunter) responsibility to ensure the correction of the switch, and not his.
20
 Both of the cases 
of Langley and Williams could just be coincidences.  
 
The dynamite on board the trucks was an import from Germany, and was not regular 
dynamite, but blasting gelatine, which was considered safer than normal dynamite. Blasting 
gelatine requires a detonator to be set off, and it can endure intense heat without exploding.
21
 
There were also other instances of accidents involving a crash with trucks carrying blasting 
gelatine, where the crates fell out and broke, but still there was no detonation.
22
 Furthermore, 
blasting gelatine that was removed from the trucks before the explosion was tested by an 
esteemed Scottish engineer who was visiting the Transvaal on business, and found to be of a 
high quality and was in a very good condition.
23
 This definitely asks the question of how the 
blasting gelatine exploded. Remains of detonators were found after the explosion and if there 
were in fact cases of detonators on the trucks, how would they have ignited the dynamite? If 
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for example there are two cases, one contains dynamite and the other contains detonators, 
they fall and break open; would their proximity and possible contact be enough to cause a 
detonation? Experts and those with experience believe this not to be the case.
24
  
 
The dynamite was meant to be delivered on the Monday – it was taken, not received and 
returned. The Railway switch was meant to be set correctly, it was said to be right and then it 
was ultimately not. The shunting train was said to be going at only two miles an hour, yet its 
crash was significant enough to overturn the trucks. Blasting gelatine can endure heat and it 
can also endure a fair amount of movement, even falling without exploding yet it exploded 
following the collision. There were missing detonators. There was negligence and potential 
bribery. There were insinuations that the labourer who cleaned the railway switch might have 
accidentally changed it. There are things that were not meant to happen that did and one has 
to ask how. The conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry, include that the witnesses did not 
show the direct cause of the explosion, and thus the direct cause was unknown, and rightfully 
so. The minutes did state that the “facts and testimonies indicate the blast occurred through 
the negligence – be it jointly or severally – by the parties involved”.25     
 
If one says that the explosion was a conspiracy, then that would be saying that the 
conspirators were willing to kill hundreds and possibly thousands to make their point. But let 
us then consider the specifics of the location.  As was said earlier, the railway yard was 
among various residential areas, but were the residents of any significance to the possible 
conspirators? The residents were Africans, poor Afrikaners, Indians and Malays, with no 
large contingent of Uitlanders. It can be assumed that these people were not really a concern 
for the conspirators. The explosion took place in the day when most of the men were at work, 
thus most of the labour force from this area was maintained. The willingness to kill people 
offers the biggest obstacle to the theory of a conspiracy because how can one prove that? The 
Reform Committee was prepared to back a forceful takeover of the Rand by supporting the 
Jameson Raid, and men would surely have died if a prolonged conflict erupted from that. But 
is that enough to argue this point? The British Empire at that time had had its fair share of 
colonial conquest and violence, so what would a little more have mattered? War would come 
later and the concessions were considered one of the major causes of the conflict. Although 
                                                 
24
 Friedrich Krieger. Testimony given at the Commission of Inquiry. 11 March 1896, TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – 
Notulen van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, p. 12-13. 
25
 TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – “Rapport van die Commissie tot Onderzoek der dynamite-ontploffing”, Notulen van de 
Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, 1896. p. 48. 
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the British government did sent telegrams of sympathy and condolences, and inquired about 
the amount of possible Britons killed – usual diplomatic protocols?26  
 
It all comes down to how far the Uitlanders or rather „capitalist‟ Uitlanders would have gone 
for what they wanted, which was the removal of Kruger. The same question can be posed at 
British intentions. However, Jean van der Poel shows us that the “capitalist” Uitlanders 
merely wanted to use the threat of force to bluff their way around Kruger, and muscle him in 
to their agenda. The „capitalists‟ had too much too lose via an armed conflict, thus they 
wanted to create the situation of potential revolution that would both intimidate the Kruger 
government, and give the British government a tangible reason to intervene in the Transvaal 
under these circumstances.
27
 The British government was content with regional hegemony 
during the early 1890s, as well as the territory they had. Although the idea of a Federation of 
South Africa appealed to some, for the most part as long as they had influence over the 
Transvaal, specifically with regard to its foreign policy and relations, all was well.
28
 It can 
also be seen that both the Transvaal and British governments were prepared to protect what 
they had. It was thus the influence of certain politicians and more so businessmen that lead to 
the Jameson Raid. Although the full story of the pre-Raid are too lengthy to discuss here, 
what can be restated are the issues of the dynamite and railway monopolies and their role in 
broadening the grievances of the Uitlander movement.    
    
The very real violence and destruction of the explosion would have gone against the idea of 
creating a “threat”. The risk of detonating explosives in Johannesburg would have proved too 
much for any of the involved parties, especially the mining houses who had the most to lose. 
Thus it is unlikely that the explosion was a conspiracy. At the very least one can consider that 
the cause or causes of the explosion were suspicious, and in fact when looking at some of the 
above mentioned information, it is still very much up for discussion. Moreover, if the 
Braamfontein Explosion was a plot to discredit the Railway Company and the Dynamite 
Company, it did initially succeed, but ultimately failed. Both would recover following the 
disaster, until the Anglo-Boer War that is. The German dynamite however was not trusted by 
the public again. There was also an increase in general caution concerning dynamite and 
                                                 
26
 The Cape Times, 24 February 1896, “Rand Catastrophe,” p. 5. 
27
 J. van der Poel: The Jameson Raid, p. 9. 
28
 Ibid., p. 12. 
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proposals of more regulations.
29
 The events that led up to the moment the dynamite exploded 
are strange, coupled with the fact that the exact cause of the detonation is unknown adds 
intrigues to what can be perceived as a mystery.   
 
The Braamfontein Explosion, though unique and vastly destructive in character, ultimately 
means nothing towards the overall climate of the pre-war Rand. The lack of academic 
literature further strengthens the fact that this disaster was forgotten, possibly because of the 
absence of more enticing consequences. The working class families and labour force felt the 
personal affects, as in these pockets were felt the loss of property and close family members. 
However to those who really ran the Rand, the explosion meant little, only a few precarious 
days when their dynamite supply was slowed and in question. Any regulation change too 
would have mattered little as the administration would dramatically change after the British 
marched into Pretoria four years later. Even though the explosion made way for an 
improvement in working class housing from congregated iron to bricks, this feature was 
already part of the mining town‟s character – moving from tents to shacks to brick abodes in 
just twenty years.
30
 The situation on the Rand was prone for a dynamite disaster. There was a 
general carelessness with regards to explosives at the time of the explosion and it became 
clear that safety in some cases took a backseat to profit and convenience. These combined 
attitudes would eventually pay the price, but then again it seemed that the city of gold could 
afford it. 
 
To briefly recap the role of the concessions in all of this, the conclusion will turn one last 
time to the Jameson Raid.  If the Raid was not indirectly responsible for the explosion as 
Chilvers suggested, then it is possible that the concessions were – in two ways.31 The first, 
being that both the Dynamite and the Railway Companies had no competitors – it was only 
them on their respective fields. Had there been other available services, the explosion might 
never have happened. Those who criticise monopolies usually bring forth its harm for the 
consumer, both in cost and quality. In short, not only were the costs of their services 
expensive, the quality and consciousness of both companies were lacking. The quality of the 
product however was scrutinized and found to be more than adequate. Secondly, if the 
                                                 
29
 A. P. Cartwright: The Dynamite Company: The Story of African Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited. 
p. 73. 
30
 C. van Onselen: New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914, p. 2. 
31
 H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, pp. 127-128. 
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explosion was an Uitlander conspiracy, then its cause and purpose would have been an 
assault on the concessions and the policies of the Kruger government. These are the same 
underlining currents that played a major part in the causes of the Anglo-Boer War, only three 
years later.
32
 However an Uitlander conspiracy is not being endorsed here as it would have 
gone against their reasoning.  
 
Anna H. Smith, puts the concept of a cause in a concise yet inconclusive prose: “Because of 
some complications due to concessions and political undercurrents, some trucks of dynamite 
had been left in the open under a blazing sun for three days.”33 The only debatable thing 
about Smith‟s reasoning is the three days in the sun concept. It was proved that the blasting 
gelatine could withstand the heat of the sun and even hotter temperatures.
34
 But „concessions‟ 
and „political undercurrents‟ forms the basis for the right questions and direction. The 
Concessions did not ignite the dynamite, but they did lay the foundations for the environment 
within which the explosion took place. However these ideas need not stop at the top of their 
echelons, for the common man within each plays more of a part than the director or 
concession hunter.  
 
Kruger who tried to defend his state from the encroachment of Uitlanders and a British 
dominated Transvaal, handed over much of his country‟s commerce to other Uitlanders, in 
the form of the concessions.
35
 The Dutch railroad built under the Kruger awarded concession, 
harmed the same vulnerable Afrikaners that the President attempted to help by giving them 
land on the Rand. Many had their livelihoods taken away with the introduction of the 
railway.
36
 Using the Braamfontein Explosion as another example, it can be stated that the 
concessions did more harm to the Transvaal and its people than good, and at the end of the 
day was a prelude to war. What the explosion did, was prove the incompetence of two of the 
most controversial concessions on the Rand, and effectively changed nothing.       
 
                                                 
32
 C. T. Keto: "The aftermath of the Jameson Raid and American decision making in foreign affairs, 
1896." Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, (70), (8), 1980, p. 10. 
33
 A. H. Smith, (ed.): Pictorial History of Johannesburg. No. 3. Juta & Company, for the Africana Museum, p. 
47. 
34
 Ibid.; TAB – SS – R1771/96, Report on the Condition and Quality of 120 Cases of Blasting Gelatine lying at 
No. 2 Magazine, Braamfontein. 
35
 J. S. Marais: The Fall of Kruger's Republic, p. 23. 
36
 C. van Onselen: Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886-1914. 1 New 
Babylon. pp. 145-146. 
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The unfortunate series of events that probably led to the explosion, could have been avoided, 
it was just a simple case of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. The word “probably” 
is used here, because it can never be ascertained whether there was something wrong with the 
dynamite that exploded, adding to that, the dynamite that survived the explosion was 
examined and found to be in a sound condition. Therefore the Commission of Inquiry‟s 
conclusions that the “facts and testimonies indicate the blast occurred through the negligence 
– be jointly or severely – by the parties involved…” substantiate that the exact cause of the 
explosion can never be known.
37
 One could come up with alternative theories as to what 
caused the explosion, because it is a rich area however as historians the sources we find give 
us the primary facts we need to construct and present our finding, no matter how temping a 
conspiracy or two may be. It was a tumultuous time in the history of the Witwatersrand, but 
when has there ever not been since the discovery of gold there. 
 
 
                                                 
37
 TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – “Rapport van die Commissie tot Onderzoek der dynamite-ontploffing”, Notulen van de 
Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te Johannesburg, 1896, p. 48. 
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Appendix 1 
Sketch-card from Commission of Investigation
1
 
2
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 TAB – SS – R1771/96, Rapport van de Commissie Tot Onderzoek der Dynamiet Ontploffing. p. 234. 
2
 Note north and south, the sketch is drawn facing south.  
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Appendix 2 
Sketch of Railway Switch Mechanism
3
 
4
 
  
                                                 
3
 TAB – SS – R1771/96, Rapport van de Commissie Tot Onderzoek der Dynamiet Ontploffing, p. 237. 
4
 Figure 1 shows the correct setting and Figure 2 shows the incorrect setting. 
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Appendix 3 
Cloud of smoke, from a few kilometres away
5
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 www.labuschagne.info/the-braamfontein-explosion.htm#.WKM4WDXMh68 (11 October 2016). 
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6
 
  
                                                 
6
 H. A. Chilvers: Out of the Crucible, p. 126 - b. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
Appendix 4 
The crater made by the explosion
7
 
 
 
  
                                                 
7
 TAB – Photograph: 3359. “The pit caused by explosion,” 1896. 
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Appendix 5 
President Paul Kruger Walking through the Wanderers Hall
8
 
 
 
  
                                                 
8
 TAB – Photograph: 18788. “Die Dinamiet-ontploffing. Pres Kruger besoek die Wanderers Hospitaal.” 
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Appendix 6 
Search parties among the debris
9
 
 
 
  
                                                 
9
 TAB – Photograph: 3362. “The Dynamite Explosion. Search Parties at Work.” 
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Appendix 7 
 “Watching His Dead Mistress’s Property”10 
 
 
  
                                                 
10
 TAB – Photograph: 3364. „Watching His Dead Mistress‟s Property, Johannesburg,” 1896. 
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Appendix 8 
Homeless and Wounded Sheltered at the Agricultural Show-yard
11
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
11
 www.ebay.ie/itm/SOUTH-AFRICA-Wounded-from-the-Dynamite-Explosion-at-Johannesburg-old-Print-
1896-/182363753278?hash=item2a75ba0b3e:g:Iu0AAOSwB09YNcFB (17 January 2016). Sketch drawn by 
Milton Prior.  
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Appendix 9 
 
Lists of Killed as given to the office of the State Secretary
12
 
 
Transvaal: 
                                                 
12
 TAB – SSA 1896: 339, Blanke personen gedood by het ongeluk. Dynamite ontploffing 19 February 1896.; 
TAB – SSA 1896: 339, Kleurlingen gedood by het ongeluk. Dynamite ontploffing 19 February 1896. 
13
 “//” – Indicates no age given.  
Nr. Name Sex Age
13
 
1 A. P. M. Strydon male 12 years 
2 W. G. van der Walt male // 
3 H. H. K. van der Walt male // 
4 Mrs van der Walt female 61 years 
5 Al. Joh Roestorif female // 
6 Piet Overholger male // 
7 Maria W. de Beer female // 
8 Kate A. de Beer female 4 years 
9 N. le Roux male // 
10 Aletta Swarts female // 
11 W. A. van Deventer male // 
12 S. F. du Preez female // 
13 Mrs Ryan female // 
14 “Child of Mrs Ryan” female // 
15 A. S. du Preez Female // 
16 F. Kruger female 13 years 
17 A. Dixon female // 
18 K. A. de Beer female // 
19 Steph. Smith male // 
20 Mrs Holder female 42 years 
21 H. van der Walt male 60 years 
22 S. Naude male 12 years 
23 F. Short male  21 years 
24 de Beer male 10 years 
25 Naude female 11 years 
26 S. Swanepoel male 20 years 
27 M. Marais female 4 years 
28 F. Elskie male 25 years 
29 I. R.  Bezhuidenhout male 10 years 
30 Isaac Powell male 55 years 
31 G. Roustoff female 38 years 
32 Stoffel le Roux male 71 years 
33 John J. Meintjies  male 4 years 
34 M. J. de Beer male 5 months 
35 H. Moss male 21 years 
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Cape Colony: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unknown Nationality: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Nationalities: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Africans: 
36 S. le Roux  male 15 years 
37 Naude male 1 year 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 W. Wilson male // 
2 O. E. Mac Casley female 9 months 
3 D. I. Theron male 8 months 
4 G. C. Ley male // 
5 P. F. Krugel female // 
6 Mrs Fray female // 
7 Mrs du Plessis female // 
8 M. C. Baker female // 
9 Carly Lewis  female // 
10 J. Mehem male 69 years 
11 J. Baker male 6 years 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 J. W. Smith male // 
2 H. A. Baker male 6 months 
3 Unidentified Woman female 35 years 
4 W. Hoy male 16 years 
5 J. Hare male 2 months 
6 E. Brown female 1  year 
7 1 Baby male // 
8 1 Girl female  // 
9 // female 3 years 
10 Elsie Viljoen female // 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 
J. H. Smith (Orange Free 
State) 
male // 
2 H. R. Moss (English) male 22 years 
3 Blaukenberg (German) female “child” 
4 C. Duarde (Portuguese)  male // 
5 Francis Joseph (Greek) male 52 years 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Stephanus male // 
2 Bockey // // 
3 Wander // // 
4 Manuel Mackesse // // 
5 Unknown  // // 
6 Unknown // // 
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Cape Coloured: 
 
 
 
 
 
Malay: 
 
 
 
Chinese: 
 
 
 
 
Arabian:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 Unknown // // 
8 Unknown // // 
9 Unknown // // 
10 1 Partial Body // // 
11 1 Partial Body // // 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Abraham male // 
2 Sarah Williams female // 
3 Bockie male // 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Achmet Orlell male // 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Livaal // // 
2 Unknown // // 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Ibrahim // // 
2 Bothker // // 
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Appendix 10 
 
Lists of Wounded as given to the office of the State Secretary
14
 
 
Transvaal Citizens: 
                                                 
14
 TAB – SSA 1896: 339, Blanke personen gewondt by het ongeluk. Dynamite ontploffing 19 February 1896.; 
TAB – SSA 1896: 339, Kleurlingen gewondt by het ongeluk. Dynamite ontploffing 19 February 1896.  
15
 “//” – Indicates no age given. 
Nr. Name Sex Age
15
 
1 E. J. van Jaarsveld Female 3 years 
2 de Beer Male 5 months 
3 A. Jacobs Female 21 years 
4 A. de Rocstoff Female 10 years 
5 J. J. van Jaarsveld Male 5 years 
6 C. M. van Jaarsveld Female  25 years 
7 A. Jordaan Female  22 years 
8 A. Meintjies Female 12 years 
9 Labuschagne Female 41 years 
10 J. Strydom Female 53 years 
11 B. van der Walt Female 13 years 
12 M. Powell Female 46 years 
13 Mrs Mulder Female 60 years 
14 K. Britz Female 18 years 
15 A. Britz Female 13 years 
16 P. Meintjies Male 4 years 
17 J. J.  Bezhuidenhout    Male 12 years 
18 D. Waldeck Male 27 years 
19 P. Powell Female 11 years 
20 B. van der Heever Male  62 years 
21 C. de Witl Male 33 years 
22 C. Rocstoff Male 38 years 
23 C. Volschenk Male 15 years 
24 van der Berg Male 19 years 
25 P. Vermaak Female 10 years 
26 W. A. du Plessis Female // 
27 L. Elske Female 4 years 
28 B. Vermaak Female 6 years 
29 M. Kruger Female 19 years 
30 K. Grey Female 42 years 
31 W. Vermaak Male 14 years 
32 W. Ryan Male 8 years 
33 L. Roberts Female 14 years 
34 N. Meyer Male 78 years 
35 N. J. Brett Male 23 years 
36 L. Kaiser Female 4 years 
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Cape Colony: 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 P.N. Carstens male 40 years 
2 R. Johnston male 35 years 
3 A. Moll female ? 
4 H. Forskik male 13 years 
5 T. Lunt female 17 years 
6 M. P female 16 years 
7 Elgie Moss female 25 years 
8 C. E. Pannymore  female 62 years 
9 M. van Niekerk female 14 years 
10 E. J. Mathews female 29 years 
11 P. Elske female 22 years 
12 A. Bezhuidenhout female 31 years 
13 A. Baker male 21 years 
14 W. Calde male 21 years 
15 P. Gilling male  23 years 
16 D. de Wet female 36 years 
17 H. Welsh male  41 years 
18 F. Jooste male 64 years 
19 R. J. Ferreira female 64 years 
20 P. Potgieter female 25 years 
21 M. Lewis female 9 years 
22 C. Cloete female 35 years 
23 E. Joves female 36 years 
24 A. Kruger female 18 years 
25 J. Dixon male 5 years 
26 C. Fell female 50 years 
27 R. Kruger female 43 years 
28 H. Fell male 40 years 
29 G. Baker male 39 years 
37 T. Naude Male 3 years 
38 J. Blaukenburg Female 23 years 
39 A. van der Merve Female 47 years 
40 R. Waldeck Female 17 years 
41 D. Kaiser Male 10 years 
42 P. Kaiser Male 41 years 
43 J. Baker Male 15 years 
44 N. Vermaak Male 61 years 
45 A. Nortje Male 25 years 
46 A. Fell Male 7 years 
47 M. Kaiser Female 11 years 
48 H. van der Walt Male 70 years 
49 V. D. Mathey Male 17 years 
50 J. J. Waldeck Male 26 years 
51 A. Powell Male 14 years 
52 F. Meelden Male 61 years 
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30 A. Venter male 10 years 
 
Orange Free State: 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 A. Butler male 24 years 
2 M. Ferreira female 20 years 
3 A. Cloete male 35 years 
4 J. Marais male 21 years 
5 M. Marais female 35 years 
6 M. Nevenhuys female 50 years 
7 E. Le Roux female 37 years 
 
English Citizens: 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 A. Welsh  male 44 years 
2 C. W. Dixon male 6 years 
3 H. Primerlee  female 36 years 
4 H. Primerlee male 14 years 
5 C. Perryware male 13 years 
6 D. Tucker male 2 years 
7 P. Tucker female 4 months 
8 A. Moss male 16 years 
9 M. Berg female 34 years 
10 G. F. Chapman male 40 years 
11 J. Ellis male 37 years 
12 L. E. Dunston female 3 months 
13 A. Sharp male 40 years 
 
Other Nationalities: 
1 W. Ludwig (Dutch) female 40 years 
2 E. Ludwig (Dutch) male 46 years 
3 A. Pand (Russian) male 57 years 
4 J. Lewis (American) male 45 years 
 
Malay:  
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Japadine male 32 years 
2 Gamite Cillie male 26 years 
3 C. Donatie male 5 years 
4 Nanie Dolley female 50 years 
5 M. Rasdine female // 
6 G. Harding female 23 years 
7 A. van der Pehaff male 35 years 
8 Aysa David male 35 years 
9 Alema female // 
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10 Pibatein female // 
11 Mahomet Hartley male  
 
Cape Colony: 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 C. Williams male 4 years 
2 M. Mayman female 33 years 
3 P. Fortuin female 18 years 
4 E. Duartes female 37 years 
5 John male // 
6 D. Barns Male  36 years 
7 Leach female 21 years 
8 C. Dwart male // 
9 P. Smit Female // 
 
Africans:  
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Petrus male // 
2 John male // 
3 Ramle Female 40 years 
4 Katrina female // 
5 Keegan female // 
6 Nelly female // 
7 Whiten male // 
8 Kleinboy male // 
 
Chinese: 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 Long Fong male // 
2 Fong Long male // 
3 Fortuin male // 
 
Other Nationalities: 
Nr. Name Sex Age 
1 G. Walker (St. Helena) female 35 years 
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Appendix 11 
Pamphlet from Dynamite Company concerning the use of explosives
16
 
 
                                                 
16
 TAB – SS – R1771/96, De Zuid-Afrikaansche Fabrieken voor Ontplofbare Stoffen, Beperkt. Instructions for 
Using the Company’s Dynamite and Gelatine Explosives. Rapport van de Commissie Tot Onderzoek der 
Dynamiet Ontploffing. pp. 129-130. 
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Appendix 12 
List of Witnesses who testified at the Commission of Inquiry
17
 
 
Christina Johanna C. Nel (eye witness) 
Dirk Soeterik (station chief, Johannesburg 
Station) 
Kerstina Small (eye witness) 
Johannes Kloek (assistant chief of 
movement) 
Alexander Bennett (mistaken identity) 
Jacobus Koenraad Pfennig (clerk – Railway 
Company) 
Joseph Williams (shunter) 
Wihelmus Hendrik Vermeulen (chief of 
railway barracks) 
James Hudson (cart driver) 
Bastiaan Willem Janson (chief of commercial 
affairs, Railway Company) 
Jacob Bloom (locomotive driver) 
John Thomas Forth (foremen, Rand Timber 
Co.) 
Harry Fell (eye witness) Thomas Baile (magazine master) 
Matthijs Michielsen Pienaar (stoker) Janus Eduard Simpson (wagon-driver) 
Swarts (kleuriling) (wagon-driver) John Watters (transport driver) 
Fortuin (kleuriling) (wagon-driver) Willem Sharply (transport driver) 
Annie Theron (eye witness) John Watt (Rand Timber Co.) 
Adriaan Buitendag (eye witness) Fred Schmulcke (locomotive driver) 
Jack (kleine jonge kleuriling) Alexander Bennet (Found three detonators) 
Karel (kleuriling) (wagon-driver) 
Thomas Lent (special constable for the 
Sanitary Board)  
Scotty (kleuriling) (wagon-driver) Karl Wolf (dynamite selling agent) 
Willem (kleuriling) (wagon-driver) 
Joseph Buggiella (chief of department for 
dynamite cartridges) 
William Langley (magazine caretaker) Sydney Oxer (foreman-hunter) 
Alexander Powell (magazine caretaker) 
John Edward McAstin (former locomotive 
driver)  
Arthur Rutherford (repetitive of E. Lippert 
and chief magazine caretaker) 
Henry Clement Wellbeloved (clerk in 
Lippert‟s office) 
Hendrik Johannes Vermeulen (shunter) 
Gerard Rissik (secretary, Dynamite Factory, 
Leeuwfontein) 
Friedrich Krieger (director of Dynamite 
Factory, Leeuwfontein) 
George Schmidt Dumont (mine inspector) 
Andreas Hendrik Koomans (Railway 
Compnay official) 
Max Julius Hermann Francken (mine 
engineer) 
Robert Bell (inspector – Dynamite Factory, John Richard Williams (metallurgist and 
                                                 
17
 TAB – Z.A.R. 107 – Notulen van de Commissie van Onderzoek in Zake de Dynamiet-Ontploffing te 
Johannesburg, 1896. pp. 1-38. 
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Modderfontein) chemical engineer) 
Edward Jacobs (director – Railway 
Company) 
Corneille Louis Plate (official, Railway 
Company) 
Louis Wilson (official – Railway Order 
Service) 
John Alec Doyle (detective) 
Isaak Benjamin Heinemann (Railway Order 
Service) 
Franz Hoenigh (director of Dynamite 
Factory, Modderfontein) 
Thomas Bennett wagon-driver) Julius Loevy (chemist) 
Gerrit Adriaan Arnold Middleberg (director – 
Railway Company) 
Robert Rattray Tatlock (chemist and Public 
Analyst and Gas Examiner for the city of 
Glasgow) 
Johannes Willem Schuitemaker (loading 
master, Railway Company) 
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Appendix 13 
R.R. Tatlock’s Technical Report on Condition of Blasting Gelatine18 
 
“Report on the Condition and Quality of 120 Cases of Blasting Gelatine lying at No. 2 
Magazine, Braamfontein. 
 
In accordance with written instructions dated 2
nd
, March, 1896, received from Messrs, Rooth 
& Wessels, Pretoria, acting for the Zuid Afrikaansche Fabrieken voor Ontplofbare Stoffen, I 
have made an inspection of the above name Blasting Gelatine, and have taken representative 
samples, and have subjected the same to the recognised chemical tests, as regards their safety 
in transit, storage and use; and have now to report as follows: 
 
On Friday, 6
th
. inst. at 3 p.m. I visited the No. 2 Magazine, Braamfontein, in order to inspect 
and otherwise examine the said 120 cases of B/Gelatine, which, as I had been previously 
informed by Mr Klimke, State Mining Engineer, were part of the consignment, the bulk of 
which exploded on the railway siding on the afternoon of the 19
th
, and also to take 
representative samples, and to test the same as to the condition of the material and its safety 
for transit, storage and use. The following gentlemen were also present by arrangement: Mr 
Klimke, State Mining Engineer, Detective Doyle, Dr Loevy, Mr Williams, Dr Kleiner, Mr 
Franke, Mr Schimtz-Dumont, and two gentlemen representing the Magazine owners.  
 
On entering the Magazine it was at once seen that the floor and walls were perfectly dry and 
free from nitro-glycerine, proving that no trace of that liquid had escaped. The temperature of 
the magazine at the time was 75° F (equal to 24° C). 
 
A general examination of 101 cases piled in one stack showed that these were quite dry, and 
that there had been no escape of any n/glycerine from them. They were perfectly good 
condition, and it was not considered necessary to open them or to examine them farther.  
 
Precisely the same remarks apply to 12 cases which were stacked in another part of the 
Magazine.  
 
The only B/Gelatine in the Magazine was 7 cases which had been placed by themselves, and 
which, the State Mining Engineer informed me, were those which had been selected, at 
random, by the chief detective, as representative of the said 120 cases, for the purposes of the 
Authorities. These seven cases were secured with cord, and sealed with two seals: (1) 
“MijnComissaris, Johannesburg, Z.A.R.” and (2) “F.H.C.” (monogram). They were 
numbered respectively: 376, 427, 469, 474, 610, 614, 621. The cases numbered respectively 
427, 474, and 610 had been broken, as if by a blow, and it was explained that this had been 
caused by these three having been knocked off a trolly by the explosion. None of the contents 
had been lost, however the lid of the case numbered 614 had also been broken, but it was 
explained that this arose from its having been purposely opened by Mr Langley, before it was 
taken possession of along with the other six by the Detective Department. All the cases were 
dove-tailed, and were farther secured by some brass nails, with occasionally an iron nail. The 
                                                 
18
 TAB – SS – R1771/96, Report on the Condition and Quality of 120 Cases of Blasting Gelatine lying at No. 2 
Magazine, Braamfontein. 
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lids were fastened on with iron wire “driving screw” nails. All the cases were then opened, 
and each was found to contain a printed copy of the Rules and Regulations issues by the Coy. 
to be complied with in order to ensure safety in use. Each case contained five bags made of 
stout varnished calico (which was water proof), filled with the cartridges, of which one bag, 
typical of the others, contained 73, so that on the same footing each case would contain 365 
cartridges. All the bags were taken out of the cases, and the wood of the latter examined 
thoroughly both outside and inside, but no traces of n/glycerine could be detected, so that 
none could possibly have exuded from the cartridges. The individual cartridges themselves 
also showed no sign whatever of exudation or “sweating” of n/glycerine, and were perfectly 
dry and sound. I can say with certainty that I never saw a lot of B/Gelatine in better condition 
or more sound looking. I then took samples, consisting of a cartridge from each bag, or five 
from each case making 35 in all.  
 
Of these 35 cartridges I selected one from each box, or 7 in all, for chemical examination and 
testing, which I have now carried out in Dr Loevy‟s laboratory, here.  
The tests applied were: 
 
1. The Heat or Vapour Test. 
2. The Exudation and Softening Test. 
3. The Water Exudation Test. 
4. Acidity. 
5. Physical Examination. 
    
All of these tests were applied to each of the seven cartridges. 
 
1. The Heat or Vapour Test. This is the principal test described by the Home Office in 
England, B/Gelatine, Dynamite and all other N/Glycerine preparation. It consists in heating 
up 50 grains of the B/Gelatine ground up with 100 grains of French Chalk in a test tube at 
160° F (equal to 71° C) for ten minutes, at the end of which time if no brown or blue 
coloration is produced on a piece of Iodide of Potassium and Starch paper suspended in the 
tube, the conditions of the test are complied with. All the cartridges passed the test easily, 
none of them giving any trace of colour even at the end of 20 minutes, which is double the 
time specified for the duration of the test.  
 
2. The Exudation and Softening Test. This consists in heating sections of the cartridges to 90° 
F (equal to 32.2° C) for three successive days leaving them to cool to normal temperature 
during the night. At the end of this period the sections should retain their form, should not 
shrink more than 25 per cent in length, and should not exude any n/glycerine. All the 
cartridges complied with this requirement in every particular, although No. 469 was rather 
softer than is desirable, but still, in my opinion, quite good and safe. This softness arises from 
the difficulty or obtaining absolute uniform cotton on all occasions, for making the gun-
cotton which is contained in B/Gelatine to the extent of 7 per cent, the remaining 93 per cent 
consisting of N/Glycerine. Cotton, being a natural product, varies somewhat in quality, 
whereas glycerine being an artificial product, can be purified to any required degree; and the 
tests show that the N/glycerine has been “thoroughly purified”. 
 
3. The Water Exudation Test. This consists in placing sections of the cartridges in water for 
24 hours, when no exudation of n/glycerine should take place, showing that no risk is 
incurred by the B/Gelatine getting wet, or even by its lying under water. In this respect 
B/Gelatine differs from Dynamite, for while contact with water expels all the n/glycerine 
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from the latter, the former is not deteriorated in anyway. All the samples stood this test with 
ease, not a drop of n/glycerine escaping.  
 
4. Acidity. All the cartridges were tested, with delicate Red and Blue Litmus Paper, for 
acidity, but there was no trace of acidity in any of them. On the contrary they were rather 
slightly alkaline, which is due to traces of carbonate of soda remaining in the n/glycerine, the 
latter having been agitated with a solution of that substance in order to ensure perfect 
freedom from acid.  
 
5. Physical Appearance. Examination by a high power lens showed that the B/Gelatine was 
uniform in character, thoroughly gelatinised; and that it contained no free cotton or gun-
cotton fibre.  
 
Remarks 
As the result of my examination and tests of this B/Gelatine, I have no hesitation in saying 
that it is of good quality, perfectly safe to carry, handle, store or use, under, of course, the 
usual precautions, which must always apply to every explosive, even of the highest quality, 
and that there is nothing about it, either chemical or physical which could produce, or tend to 
produce any accidental explosion. Farther, I may say that I have not seen any lot of 
B/Gelatine in better condition, and that it is not probable that any better or safer article will be 
produced.   
(sgd) R.R. Tatlock, F.R.S.M., F.J.C., F.C.S 
Public Analyst and Gas Examiner  
for the city of Glasgow. 
Johannesburg, 12
th
. March, 1896.  
 
The magazine did not contain any Dynamite and the 120 cases about referred to consisted 
entirely of B/Gelatine.  
(sgd) R.R.T.” 
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Appendix 14 
Aerial Map of Contemporary Johannesburg – Affected Area19 
20
 
 
 
  
                                                 
19
 S. Christ: (Aerial Map of Contemporary Johannesburg – Affected Area), 2016.  
20
 Note the large bend in the railway line. 
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